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In the fall of 1994,  the publication of Herrnstein and 
Murray's book The Bell Curve sparked a new round of 
debate about the meaning of  intelligence test scores and 
the nature of intelligence.  The debate was characterized 
by strong assertions as well as by strong feelings.  Un- 
fortunately, those assertions often revealed serious mis- 
understandings  of what has (and has not) been dem- 
onstrated by scientific research  in this field. Although 
a great deal is now known, the issues remain complex 
and in many cases still unresolved. Another unfortunate 
aspect of the debate was that many participants made 
little effort to distinguish scientific issues  from political 
ones. Research findings were often assessed not so much 
on their merits or their scientific standing as on their 
supposed political implications. In such a climate, in- 
dividuals who wish to make their own judgments find 
it hard to know what to believe. 
Reviewing the intelligence  debate at its meeting of 
November 1994, the Board of Scientific Affairs (BSA) of 
the American Psychological Association (APA) concluded 
that there was urgent need for an authoritative  report on 
these issues--one that all sides could use as a basis for 
discussion. Acting by unanimous vote, BSA established a 
Task Force charged  with preparing  such  a report. Ulric 
Neisser, Professor of  Psychology at Emory University and 
a member of  BSA, was appointed Chair. The APA Board 
on the Advancement of  Psychology in the Public Interest, 
which  was  consulted  extensively  during  this  process, 
nominated one member of  the Task Force," the Committee 
on Psychological  Tests and Assessment nominated an- 
other," a third was nominated by the Council of  Represen- 
tatives. Other members were chosen by an extended con- 
sultative process,  with the aim  of representing  a  broad 
range of expertise and opinion. 
The Task Force met twice, in January and March of 
1995. Between and after these meetings,  drafts of  the var- 
ious  sections  were  circulated,  revised,  and  revised  yet 
again. Disputes were resolved by discussion.  As a result, 
the report presented here has the unanimous support  of 
the entire Task Force. 
1. Concepts of Intelligence 
Individuals differ from one another in their ability to un- 
derstand complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the envi- 
ronment, to learn from experience, to engage in various 
forms  of reasoning,  to  overcome  obstacles  by  taking 
thought.  Although  these  individual  differences  can  be 
substantial,  they are  never entirely consistent: A  given 
person's intellectual  performance will vary on different 
occasions, in  different  domains, as judged by different 
criteria. Concepts of "intelligence" are attempts to clarify 
and organize this complex set of phenomena. Although 
considerable clarity has been achieved in some areas, no 
such conceptualization has yet answered all the important 
questions and none commands universal assent. Indeed, 
when two dozen prominent theorists were recently asked 
to define intelligence, they gave two dozen somewhat dif- 
ferent definitions (Sternberg &  Detterman,  1986).  Such 
disagreements are not cause for dismay. Scientific research 
rarely begins with fully agreed definitions, though it may 
eventually lead to them. 
This  first  section  of our  report  reviews  the  ap- 
proaches to intelligence that are currently influential, or 
that seem to be becoming so. Here (as in later sections) 
much of our discussion is devoted to the dominant psy- 
chometric approach, which has not only inspired the most 
research and attracted the most attention (up to this time) 
but is by far the most widely used in practical settings. 
Nevertheless,  other points of view deserve serious con- 
sideration. Several current theorists argue that there are 
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77 many different "intelligences" (systems of abilities), only 
a few of  which can be captured by standard psychometric 
tests.  Others emphasize the role of culture,  both in es- 
tablishing different conceptions of intelligence and in in- 
fluencing the acquisition  of intellectual  skills.  Develop- 
mental psychologists, taking yet another direction, often 
focus more on the processes by which all children come 
to think intelligently than on measuring individual dif- 
ferences among them. There is also a new interest in the 
neural and biological bases of intelligence,  a  field of re- 
search that seems certain to expand in the next few years. 
In this brief report, we cannot do full justice to even 
one such approach. Rather than trying to do so, we focus 
here on a limited and rather specific set of questions: 
•  What are the significant conceptualizations of in- 
telligence at this time? (Section  1) 
•  What do intelligence  test scores mean, what do 
they  predict,  and  how  well  do  they  predict  it? 
(Section 2) 
•  Why do individuals differ in intelligence, and es- 
pecially in their scores on intelligence tests? Our 
discussion of these questions implicates both ge- 
netic factors (Section 3) and environmental factors 
(Section 4). 
•  Do various ethnic groups display different patterns 
of performance on intelligence tests, and if so what 
might explain those differences? (Section 5) 
•  What significant scientific issues are presently un- 
resolved? (Section 6) 
Public discussion of these issues has been especially 
vigorous since the  1994  publication  of Herrnstein  and 
Murray's The Bell Curve, a controversial volume which 
stimulated many equally controversial reviews and replies. 
Nevertheless, we do not directly enter that debate. Herrn- 
stein and Murray (and many of their critics) have gone 
well beyond the scientific findings,  making explicit rec- 
ommendations on various aspects of public policy. Our 
concern here, however, is with science rather than policy. 
The charge to our Task Force was to prepare a  dispas- 
sionate survey of the state of the art: to make clear what 
has been scientifically established,  what  is presently in 
dispute,  and  what  is  still  unknown.  In  fulfilling  that 
charge, the only recommendations we shall make are for 
further research and calmer debate. 
The Psychometric Approach 
Ever since Alfred Binet's great success in devising tests 
to distinguish mentally retarded children from those with 
behavior problems, psychometric instruments have played 
an important part in European and American life. Tests 
are used for many purposes, such as selection, diagnosis, 
and evaluation. Many of the most widely used tests are 
not  intended  to  measure  intelligence  itself but  some 
closely  related  construct:  scholastic  aptitude,  school 
achievement,  specific  abilities,  etc.  Such  tests  are  es- 
pecially important for selection purposes. For preparatory 
school,  it's the SSAT; for college, the SAT or ACT; for 
graduate school, the GRE; for medical school, the MCAT; 
for law school, the LSAT; for business school, the GMAT. 
Scores on intelligence-related tests matter, and the stakes 
can be high. 
Intelligence tests.  Tests of intelligence itself (in 
the psychometric sense) come in many forms. Some use 
only a single type of item or question; examples include 
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (a measure of chil- 
dren's verbal intelligence) and Raven's Progressive Ma- 
trices (a nonverbal, untimed test that requires inductive 
reasoning about perceptual patterns). Although such in- 
struments are useful for specific purposes, the more fa- 
miliar  measures  of general  intelligence--such  as  the 
Wechsler tests and the Stanford-Binet--include many dif- 
ferent types of items,  both verbal and  nonverbal.  Test- 
takers may be asked to give the meanings of words,  to 
complete a series of pictures, to indicate which of several 
words does not belong with the others, and the like. Their 
performance can then be scored to yield several subscores 
as well as an overall score. 
By convention,  overall intelligence  test  scores  are 
usually converted to a scale in which the mean is 100 and 
the standard deviation is  15.  (The standard deviation is 
a measure of the variability of the distribution of scores.) 
Approximately 95% of the population has scores within 
two standard deviations of the mean, i.e., between 70 and 
130.  For historical reasons, the term "IQ" is often used 
to  describe  scores on tests  of intelligence.  It originally 
referred to an "Intelligence Quotient" that was formed 
by dividing a so-called mental age by a chronological age, 
but this procedure is no longer used. 
Intercorrelations  among  tests.  Individuals 
rarely perform equally well on all the different kinds of 
items included in a test of intelligence. One person may 
do relatively better on verbal than on spatial items, for 
example, while another may show the opposite pattern. 
Nevertheless, subtests measuring different abilities tend 
to be positively correlated: people who score high on one 
such subtest are likely to be above average on others as 
well. These complex patterns of correlation can be clar- 
ified by factor analysis, but the results of such analyses 
are often controversial themselves. Some theorists (e.g., 
Spearman,  1927) have emphasized the importance of a 
general factor, g, which represents what all the tests have 
in common; others (e.g., Thurstone, 1938) focus on more 
specific group factors such as memory, verbal compre- 
hension, or number facility. As we shall see in Section 2, 
one common view today envisages something like a  hi- 
erarchy of factors with g at the apex. But there is no full 
agreement on what g actually means: it has been described 
as a mere statistical regularity (Thomson,  1939), a kind 
of mental energy (Spearman, 1927), a generalized abstract 
reasoning ability (Gustafsson, 1984), or an index measure 
of neural processing speed (Reed & Jensen,  1992). 
There have been many disputes over the utility of 
IQ and g.  Some theorists  are critical of the entire psy- 
chometric  approach  (e.g.,  Ceci,  1990;  Gardner,  1983; 
Gould, 1978), while others regard it as firmly established 
(e.g., Carroll, 1993; Eysenck, 1973; Herrnstein & Murray, 
1994; Jensen,  1972).  The critics do not dispute the sta- 
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forms of achievement--especially school achievement-- 
rather effectively  (see Section 2). They do argue, however, 
that to base a concept of intelligence on test scores alone 
is to ignore many important aspects of mental ability. 
Some of  those aspects are emphasized in other approaches 
reviewed below. 
Multiple Forms of Intelligence 
Gardner's theory.  A relatively new approach is 
the theory of "'multiple intelligences" proposed by How- 
ard Gardner in his book Frames of  Mind (1983). Gardner 
argues that our conceptions of intelligence should be in- 
formed not only by work with "normal" children and 
adults but also by studies of gifted persons (including so- 
called "savants"), of virtuosos and experts in various do- 
mains, of valued abilities in diverse cultures, and of in- 
dividuals  who  have  suffered  selective  forms  of brain 
damage. These considerations have led him to include 
musical, bodily-kinesthetic, and various forms of personal 
intelligence in the scope of his theory along with more 
familiar  linguistic,  logical-mathematical,  and  spatial 
abilities. (Critics of the theory argue, however, that some 
of  these are more appropriately described as special talents 
than as forms of "intelligence.") 
In Gardner's view, the scope of psychometric tests 
includes only linguistic, logical, and some aspects of spa- 
tial intelligence; other forms have been almost entirely 
ignored. Even in the domains on which they are ostensibly 
focused, the paper-and-pencil format of most tests rules 
out many kinds of intelligent performance that matter a 
great deal in everyday life, such as giving an extempo- 
raneous talk (linguistic) or being able to find one's way 
in a new town (spatial). While the stability and validity 
of performance tests in these new domains are not yet 
clear, Gardner's argument has attracted considerable in- 
terest among educators as well as psychologists. 
Sternberg's theory.  Robert Sternberg's (1985) 
triarchic theory proposes three fundamental aspects of 
intelligence--analytic, creative, and practical--of which 
only the first is measured to any significant extent by 
mainstream tests. His investigations suggest the need for 
a balance between analytic intelligence, on the one hand, 
and creative and especially practical intelligence on the 
other. The distinction between analytic (or "academic") 
and practical intelligence has also been made by others 
(e.g., Neisser,  1976). Analytic problems, of the type suit- 
able for test construction, tend to (a) have been formulated 
by other people, (b) be clearly defined, (c) come with all 
the information needed to solve them, (d) have only a 
single right answer, which can be reached by only a single 
method, (e) be disembedded from ordinary experience, 
and (f) have little or no intrinsic interest. Practical prob- 
lems, in contrast, tend to (a) require problem recognition 
and formulation, (b) be poorly defined, (c) require infor- 
mation seeking, (d) have various acceptable solutions, (e) 
be embedded in and require prior everyday experience, 
and (f) require motivation and personal involvement. 
One important form of practical intelligence is tacit 
knowledge,  defined by Sternberg and his collaborators as 
"action-oriented knowledge, acquired without direct help 
from others, that allows individuals to achieve goals they 
personally value" (Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, & Hor- 
vath, 1995, p. 916). Questionnaires designed to measure 
tacit knowledge have been developed for various domains, 
especially business management. In these questionnaires, 
the individual is presented with written descriptions of 
various work-related situations and asked to rank a num- 
ber of options for dealing with each of them. Measured 
in this way, tacit knowledge is relatively independent of 
scores on intelligence tests; nevertheless it correlates sig- 
nificantly with various indices of  job performance (Stern- 
berg & Wagner,  1993;  Sternberg et al.,  1995).  Although 
this work is not without its critics (Jensen, 1993; Schmidt 
& Hunter, 1993), the results to this point tend to support 
the distinction between analytic and practical intelligence. 
Related findings.  Other investigators have also 
demonstrated that practical intelligence can be relatively 
independent of school performance or scores on psycho- 
metric tests. Brazilian street children, for example, are 
quite capable of doing the math required for survival in 
their street business even though they have failed math- 
ematics in  school (Carraher,  Carraher,  &  Schliemann, 
1985). Similarly, women shoppers in California who had 
no difficulty in comparing product values at the super- 
market were unable to carry out the same mathematical 
operations in paper-and-pencil tests (Lave,  1988).  In a 
study of expertise in wagering on harness races, Ceci and 
Liker (1986) found that the reasoning of the most skilled 
handicappers was implicitly based on a  complex inter- 
active model with as many as seven variables. Neverthe- 
less, individual handicappers' levels of performance were 
not correlated with their IQ scores. This means, as Ceci 
as put it, that "the assessment of the experts' intelligence 
on a  standard IQ test was irrelevant in predicting the 
complexity of their thinking at  the  racetrack"  (1990, 
p. 43). 
Cultural Variation 
It is very difficult to compare concepts of intelligence 
across cultures. English is not alone in having many words 
for different aspects of intellectual power and cognitive 
skill (wise, sensible,  smart, bright,  clever, cunning...); 
if another language has just as many, which of them shall 
we say corresponds to its speakers'  "concept of intelli- 
gence"? The few attempts to examine this issue directly 
have typically found that, even within a  given society, 
different cognitive characteristics are emphasized from 
one situation to another and from one subculture to an- 
other (Serpell,  1974;  Super,  1983;  Wober,  1974).  These 
differences extend not just to conceptions of intelligence 
but also to what is considered adaptive or appropriate in 
a broader sense. 
These issues have occasionally been addressed across 
subcultures and ethnic groups in America.  In a  study 
conducted in San Jose, California, Okagaki and Sternberg 
(1993) asked immigrant parents from Cambodia, Mexico, 
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Anglo-Americans and Mexican Americans--about their 
conceptions of child-rearing, appropriate teaching, and 
children's intelligence.  Parents  from all  groups  except 
Anglo-Americans indicated that such characteristics as 
motivation, social skills, and practical school skills were 
as or more important than cognitive characteristics for 
their conceptions of an intelligent first-grade child. 
Heath (1983) found that different ethnic groups in 
North Carolina have different conceptions of intelligence. 
To be considered as intelligent or adaptive, one must excel 
in the skills valued by one's own group. One particularly 
interesting contrast was  in the importance ascribed to 
verbal versus nonverbal communication skills--to saying 
things explicitly as opposed to using and understanding 
gestures and facial expressions. Note that while both these 
forms of communicative skill have their uses,  they are 
not equally well represented in psychometric tests. 
How testing is done can have different effects in dif- 
ferent cultural groups. This can happen for many reasons. 
Inone study, Serpell (1979) asked Zambian and English 
children to reproduce patterns in three different media: 
wire models, pencil and paper, or clay. The Zambian chil- 
dren excelled in the wire medium to which they were 
most accustomed, while the English children were best 
with pencil and paper.  Both groups performed equally 
well with clay. As this example shows, differences in fa- 
miliarity with test materials can produce marked differ- 
ences in test results. 
Developmental Progressions 
Piaget's theory.  The best-known developmen- 
tally-based conception of intelligence is certainly that of 
the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget (1972). Unlike most 
of the theorists considered here, Piaget had relatively little 
interest in individual differences. Intelligence develops-- 
in all children--through the continually shifting balance 
between the assimilation of new information into existing 
cognitive  structures  and  the  accommodation  of those 
structures themselves to the new information. To index 
the development of intelligence in this sense, Piaget de- 
vised methods that are rather different from conventional 
tests. To assess the understanding of "conservation," for 
example (roughly, the principle that material quantity is 
not  affected by mere changes  of shape),  children who 
have watched water being poured from a shallow to a tall 
beaker may be asked if there is now more water than 
before. (A positive answer would suggest that the child 
has not yet mastered the principle of conservation.) Pia- 
get's tasks can be modified to serve as measures of indi- 
vidual differences; when this is done, they correlate fairly 
well with standard psychometric tests (for a  review see 
Jensen,  1980). 
Vygotsky's theory.  The  Russian  psychologist 
Lev Vygotsky (1978) argued that all intellectual abilities 
are social in origin. Language and thought first appear in 
early interactions with parents, and continue to develop 
through contact with teachers and others. Traditional in- 
telligence tests ignore what Vygotsky called the "zone of 
proximal development," i.e., the level of  performance that 
a child might reach with appropriate help from a  sup- 
portive adult. Such tests are "static," measuring only the 
intelligence that is already fully developed. "Dynamic" 
testing, in which the examiner provides guided and graded 
feedback, can go further to give some indication of the 
child's latent potential. These ideas are being developed 
and extended by a number of contemporary psychologists 
(Brown & French, 1979; Feuerstein, 1980; Pascual-Leone 
& Ijaz,  1989). 
Biological Approaches 
Some investigators have recently turned to the study of 
the brain as a basis for new ideas about what intelligence 
is and how to measure it. Many aspects of  brain anatomy 
and physiology have been suggested as potentially relevant 
to intelligence: the arborization of  cortical neurons (Ceci, 
1990), cerebral glucose metabolism (Haier, 1993), evoked 
potentials (Caryl, 1994), nerve conduction velocity (Reed 
& Jensen,  1992), sex hormones (see Section 4), and still 
others (cf. Vernon, 1993). Advances in research methods, 
including new forms of brain imaging such as PET and 
MRI scans,  will surely add to this list.  In the not-too- 
distant future it may be possible to relate some aspects 
of test performance to specific characteristics of brain 
function. 
This brief survey has revealed a wide range of con- 
temporary  conceptions  of intelligence  and  of how  it 
should be measured. The psychometric approach is the 
oldest and best established, but others also have much to 
contribute. We should be open to the possibility that our 
understanding of intelligence in the future will be rather 
different from what it is today. 
2. Intelligence Tests and Their 
Correlates 
The correlation coefficient, r, can be computed whenever 
the scores in a sample are paired in some way. Typically 
this is because each individual is measured twice: he or 
she takes the same test on two occasions, or takes two 
different tests, or has both a test score and some criterion 
measure such as grade point average or job performance. 
(In Section 3 we consider cases where the paired scores 
are those of two different individuals, such as twins or 
parent and child.) The value of r measures the degree of 
relationship between the two sets of  scores in a convenient 
way, by assessing how well one of them (computationally 
it doesn't matter which one) could be used to predict the 
value of the other. Its sign indicates the direction of re- 
lationship: when r is negative, high scores on one measure 
predict low scores on the other. Its magnitude indicates 
the strength of  the relationship, lfr = 0, there is no relation 
at all; if r is  1 (or -  1), one score can be used to predict 
the other score perfectly. Moreover, the square of r has a 
particular meaning in cases where we are concerned with 
predicting one variable from another. When r =  .50, for 
example,  r 2 is .25:  this means (given certain linear as- 
sumptions) that 25% of the variance in one set of scores 
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while the remaining 75% is not. 
Basic Characteristics of Test Scores 
Stability.  Intelligence test scores are fairly stable 
during  development.  When  Jones  and  Bayley  (1941) 
tested a  sample of children  annually throughout child- 
hood and adolescence,  for example, scores obtained at 
age 18 were correlated r =  .77 with scores that had been 
obtained at age 6 and r  =  .89 with scores from age  12. 
When scores were averaged across several successive tests 
to remove short-term fluctuations, the correlations were 
even higher. The mean for ages 17 and 18 was correlated 
r  =  .86 with the mean for ages 5, 6, and 7, and r  =  .96 
with the mean for ages 11,  12, and  13. (For comparable 
findings in a more recent study, see Moffitt, Caspi, Hark- 
ness, &  Silva,  1993.)  Nevertheless, IQ scores do change 
over time. In the same study (Jones & Bayley, 1941), the 
average change between age  12  and age  17  was 7.1  IQ 
points; some individuals changed as much as 18 points. 
Is it possible to measure the intelligence  of young 
infants in a  similar way? Conventional tests of "infant 
intelligence" do not predict later test scores very well, but 
certain  experimental measures of infant  attention  and 
memory--originally developed for other purposes--have 
turned out to be more successful. In the most common 
procedure, a particular visual pattern is shown to a baby 
over and over again. The experimenter records how long 
the infant subject looks at the pattern on each trial; these 
looks get shorter and shorter as the baby becomes "ha- 
bituated" to it. The time required to reach a certain level 
of habituation, or the extent to which the baby now "pre- 
fers" (looks longer  at)  a  new  pattern,  is regarded  as a 
measure of some aspect of his or her information-pro- 
cessing capability. 
These habituation-based  measures, obtained from 
babies at ages ranging from three months to a year, are 
significantly correlated with the intelligence test scores of 
the same children when they get to be 2 or 4 or 6 years 
old  (for reviews see  Bornstein,  1989;  Columbo,  1993; 
McCall & Garriger, 1993). A few studies have found such 
correlations even at ages 8 or I 1 (Rose & Feldman, 1995). 
A  recent meta-analysis, based on 31  different samples, 
estimates the  average magnitude  of the  correlations  at 
about r =  .36 (McCall & Garriger, 1993). (The largest rs 
often appear in samples that include  "at risk" infants.) 
It is possible that these habituation scores (and other sim- 
ilar measures of infant cognition) do indeed reflect real 
cognitive differences, perhaps in  "speed of information 
processing" (Columbo, 1993). It is also possible, however, 
that--to a presently unknown extent--they reflect early 
differences in temperament or inhibition. 
It is important to understand what remains stable 
and what changes in the development of intelligence.  A 
child whose IQ score remains the same from age 6 to age 
18  does not exhibit the  same performance throughout 
that  period.  On  the  contrary,  steady  gains  in  general 
knowledge, vocabulary, reasoning ability, etc. will be ap- 
parent. What does not change is his or her score in com- 
parison to that of other individuals of the same age. A 
six-year-old with an IQ of 100 is at the mean of six-year- 
olds; an 18-year-old with that score is at the mean of 18- 
year-olds. 
Factors and g.  As noted in Section 1, the patterns 
ofintercorrelation among tests (i.e., among different kinds 
of items) are complex. Some pairs of tests are much more 
closely related than others, but all such correlations are 
typically positive  and  form what  is  called  a  "positive 
manifold."  Spearman (1927)  showed  that  in  any such 
manifold, some portion of the variance of scores on each 
test can be mathematically attributed to a  "general fac- 
tor," or g. Given this analysis, the overall pattern of cor- 
relations can be roughly described as produced by indi- 
vidual differences in g plus differences in the specific abil- 
ities sampled by particular tests.  In addition,  however, 
there  are  usually  patterns  of  intercorrelation  among 
groups of tests. These commonalities, which played only 
a small role in Spearman's analysis, were emphasized by 
other theorists. Thurstone (1938), for example, proposed 
an  analysis  based  primarily  on  the  concept  of group 
factors. 
While some psychologists today still regard g as the 
most fundamental measure of intelligence (e.g., Jensen, 
1980), others prefer to emphasize the distinctive profile 
of strengths and weaknesses present in each person's per- 
formance. A recently published review identifies over 70 
different abilities that can be distinguished by currently 
available tests (Carroll,  1993). One way to represent this 
structure is in terms of a hierarchical arrangement with 
a general intelligence factor at the apex and various more 
specialized abilities arrayed below it.  Such  a  summary 
merely acknowledges that performance levels on different 
tests are correlated;  it is consistent  with,  but does not 
prove, the  hypothesis that  a  common factor such  as g 
underlies those correlations. Different specialized abilities 
might also be correlated for other reasons,  such as the 
effects of education.  Thus while the g-based factor hier- 
archy is the  most widely accepted current  view of the 
structure of  abilities, some theorists regard it as misleading 
(Ceci,  1990).  Moreover,  as noted  in  Section  1,  a  wide 
range of human abilities--including many that seem to 
have intellectual  componentsmare outside the domain 
of standard psychometric tests. 
Tests as Predictors 
School  performance.  Intelligence  tests  were 
originally devised by Alfred Binet to measure children's 
ability to succeed in school. They do in fact predict school 
performance fairly well: the correlation between IQ scores 
and grades is about .50. They also predict scores on school 
achievement tests, designed to measure knowledge of the 
curriculum. Note, however, that correlations of  this mag- 
nitude account for only about 25% of the overall variance. 
Successful  school  learning  depends  on  many personal 
characteristics other than intelligence, such as persistence, 
interest in school, and willingness to study. The encour- 
agement for academic achievement that is received from 
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gether with more general cultural factors (see Section 5). 
The relationship between test scores and school per- 
formance seems to be ubiquitous.  Wherever it has been 
studied, children with high scores on tests of intelligence 
tend to learn more of what is taught in school than their 
lower-scoring peers. There may be styles of teaching and 
methods of instruction that will decrease or increase this 
correlation, but none that consistently eliminates it has 
yet been found (Cronbach & Snow,  1977). 
What children learn in school depends not only on 
their individual  abilities but also on teaching practices 
and  on  what  is  actually  taught.  Recent  comparisons 
among pupils attending school in different countries have 
made  this  especially  obvious.  Children  in  Japan  and 
China, for example, know a great deal more math than 
American  children  even  though  their  intelligence  test 
scores are quite  similar (see Section  5).  This difference 
may result from many factors, including cultural attitudes 
toward  schooling as well  as the  sheer  amount  of time 
devoted to the study of mathematics and how that study 
is organized (Stevenson &  Stigler,  1992).  In principle it 
is quite possible to improve the school learning of Amer- 
ican children--even very substantially--without changing 
their intelligence test scores at all. 
Years of education.  Some children stay in school 
longer than others;  many go on to college and perhaps 
beyond. Two variables that can be measured as early as 
elementary school correlate with the total amount of ed- 
ucation individuals will obtain: test scores and social class 
background.  Correlations  between  IQ scores and total 
years of education are about. 55, implying that differences 
in  psychometric intelligence  account for about  30%  of 
the outcome variance. The correlations of years of edu- 
cation with social class background  (as indexed  by the 
occupation/education  of a  child's parents) are also pos- 
itive, but somewhat lower. 
There are a  number of reasons why children  with 
higher test scores tend to get more education.  They are 
likely to get good grades, and to be encouraged by teachers 
and counselors; often they are placed in "college prepa- 
ratory" classes, where they make friends who may also 
encourage them.  In general,  they are likely to find the 
process of education rewarding in a way that many low- 
scoring children  do  not  (Rehberg &  Rosenthal,  1978). 
These influences are not omnipotent: some high scoring 
children do drop out of school. Many personal and social 
characteristics other than psychometric intelligence de- 
termine academic success and interest, and social privilege 
may also play a role. Nevertheless, test scores are the best 
single predictor of an individual's years of education. 
In contemporary American society, the amount of 
schooling that adults complete is also somewhat predictive 
of their  social  status.  Occupations  considered  high  in 
prestige  (e.g.,  law,  medicine,  even  corporate  business) 
usually require at least a college degree-- 16 or more years 
of education--as a condition of entry. It is partly because 
intelligence test scores predict years of education so well 
that  they  also  predict  occupational  status--and,  to  a 
smaller extent, even income (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; 
Jencks,  1979). Moreover, many occupations can only be 
entered through professional schools which base their ad- 
missions at  least partly on test scores:  the  MCAT,  the 
GMAT, the LSAT, etc. Individual scores on admission- 
related tests such as these are certainly correlated with 
scores on tests of intelligence. 
Social status and income.  How well do IQ scores 
(which can be obtained before individuals enter the labor 
force) predict such outcome measures as the social status 
or income of adults? This question is complex, in part be- 
cause another variable also predicts such outcomes: namely, 
the socioeconomic status  (SES)  of one's parents.  Unsur- 
prisingly, children of privileged families are more likely to 
attain high social status than those whose parents are poor 
and less educated.  These two predictors (IQ and parental 
SES) are by no means independent of one another; the cor- 
relation between them is around .33 (White,  1982). 
One way to look at these relationships is to begin 
with SES.  According to Jencks (1979),  measures of pa- 
rental  SES  predict  about  one-third  of the  variance  in 
young adults' social status and about one-fifth of the vari- 
ance in their income. About half of this predictive effec- 
tiveness depends on the fact that the SES of parents also 
predicts  children's  intelligence  test  scores,  which  have 
their own predictive value for social outcomes; the other 
half comes about in other ways. 
We can also begin with IQ scores, which by them- 
selves account for about one-fourth of the social status 
variance and one-sixth of the income variance. Statistical 
controls for parental SES eliminate only about a quarter 
of this predictive power. One way to conceptualize this 
effect is by comparing the occupational status (or income) 
of adult brothers who grew up in the same family and 
hence  have the  same parental  SES.  In  such  cases,  the 
brother with the higher adolescent IQ score is likely to 
have the higher adult social status and income (Jencks, 
1979).  This effect, in turn, is substantially mediated by 
education: the brother with the higher test scores is likely 
to get more schooling, and hence to be better credenfialled 
as he enters the workplace. 
Do these data imply that psychometric intelligence 
is a major determinant of social status or income? That 
depends on what one means by "major." In fact, indi- 
viduals who have the same test scores may differ widely 
in occupational status and even more widely in income. 
Consider for a  moment the distribution of occupational 
status scores for all individuals in a population, and then 
consider the conditional  distribution  of such scores for 
just those individuals who test at some given IQ. Jencks 
(1979) notes that the standard deviation of the latter dis- 
tribution may still be quite large; in some cases it amounts 
to about 88% of the standard deviation for the entire pop- 
ulation.  Viewed from this perspective, psychometric in- 
telligence appears as only one of  a great many factors that 
influence social outcomes. 
Job performance.  Scores  on  intelligence  tests 
predict various measures of  job performance: supervisor 
ratings, work samples, etc. Such correlations, which typ- 
82  February 1996  •  American Psychologist ically lie between r =  .30 and r =  .50, are partly restricted 
by the limited reliability of those measures themselves. 
They become higher when r is statistically corrected for 
this  unreliability:  in  one  survey  of  relevant  studies 
(Hunter,  1983), the mean of the corrected correlations 
was .54. This implies that, across a wide range of occu- 
pations, intelligence test performance accounts for some 
29% of the variance in job performance. 
Although these correlations can sometimes be mod- 
ified by changing methods of training or aspects of the 
job itself, intelligence test scores are at least weakly related 
to job performance in most settings. Sometimes IQ scores 
are  described as the  "best available predictor" of that 
performance. It is worth noting, however, that such tests 
predict considerably less than half the variance of job- 
related measures.  Other individual  characteristics--in- 
terpersonal skills, aspects of personality, etc.--are prob- 
ably of equal or greater importance, but at this point we 
do not have equally reliable instruments to measure them. 
Social  outcomes.  Psychometric  intelligence  is 
negatively correlated with  certain  socially  undesirable 
outcomes. For example, children with high test scores are 
less likely than lower-scoring children to engage in juvenile 
crime.  In  one  study,  Moffitt,  Gabrielli,  Mednick,  and 
Schulsinger ( 1981) found a correlation of -. 19 between 
IQ scores and.number of  juvenile offenses in a large Dan- 
ish sample; with social class controlled, the correlation 
dropped to  -. 17.  The correlations for most  "negative 
outcome" variables are typically smaller than .20, which 
means that test scores are associated with less than 4% 
of their total variance. It is important to realize that the 
causal links between psychometric ability and social out- 
comes may be indirect. Children who are unsuccessful 
in--and  hence  alienated  from--school  may  be  more 
likely to engage in delinquent behaviors for that very rea- 
son, compared to other children who enjoy school and 
are doing well. 
In summary, intelligence test scores predict a wide 
range of social outcomes with varying degrees of success. 
Correlations are highest for school achievement, where 
they account for about a  quarter of the variance. They 
are somewhat lower for job performance, and very low 
for negatively valued outcomes such  as criminality.  In 
general, intelligence tests measure only some of  the many 
personal characteristics that are relevant to life in con- 
temporary America. Those characteristics are never the 
only influence on outcomes, though in the case of school 
performance they may well be the strongest. 
Test Scores and Measures of Processing Speed 
Many recent studies  show that  the  speeds with  which 
people perform very simple perceptual and cognitive tasks 
are correlated with psychometric intelligence (for reviews 
see Ceci,  1990; Deary,  1995; Vernon,  1987). In general, 
people with higher intelligence test scores tend to appre- 
hend, scan, retrieve, and respond to stimuli more quickly 
than those who score lower. 
Cognitive correlates.  The modem study of  these 
relations began in the 1970s, as part of  the general growth 
of  interest in response time and other chronometric mea- 
sures of cognition. Many of the new cognitive paradigms 
required subjects to make same/different judgments or 
other speeded responses to visual displays. Although those 
paradigms had not been devised with individual differ- 
ences in  mind,  they could be interpreted as providing 
measures of the speed of certain information processes. 
Those speeds turned out to correlate with psychometri- 
cally-measured verbal  ability  (Hunt,  1978;  Jackson  & 
McClelland, 1979). In some problem solving tasks, it was 
possible to analyze the subjects' overall response times 
into  theoretically  motivated  "cognitive  components" 
(Sternberg,  1977); component times could then be cor- 
related with test scores in their own right. 
Although  the  size of these  correlations is  modest 
(seldom accounting for more than  10% of the variance), 
they do increase as the basic tasks were made more com- 
plex by requiring increased memory or attentional ca- 
pacity. For instance, the correlation between paired as- 
sociate learning and intelligence increases as the pairs are 
presented  at  faster rates  (Christal,  Tirre,  &  Kyllorien, 
1984). 
Choice reaction time.  In another popular cog- 
nitive paradigm, the subject simply moves his or her finger 
from a "home" button to one of eight other buttons ar- 
ranged in a  semicircle around it; these are marked by 
small lights that  indicate which  one is the target on a 
given trial (Jensen,  1987). Various aspects of the choice 
reaction times obtained in this paradigm are correlated 
with scores on intelligence tests, sometimes with values 
of r as high as -.30 or -.40 (r is negative because higher 
test scores go with  shorter times).  Nevertheless, it has 
proved difficult to make theoretical sense of the overall 
pattern of correlations, and the results are still hard to 
interpret (cf. Brody, 1992; Longstreth,  1984). 
Somewhat stronger results have been obtained in a 
variant of Jensen's  paradigm  devised by Frearson and 
Eysenck (1986). In this "odd-man-out" procedure, three 
of the eight lights are illuminated on each trial. Two of 
these are relatively close to each other while the third is 
more distant; the subject must press the button corre- 
sponding to the more isolated stimulus. Response times 
in this task show higher correlations with IQ scores than 
those in Jensen's original procedure, perhaps because it 
requires more complex forms of spatial judgment. 
Inspection time.  Another paradigm for measur- 
ing processing speed, devised to be relatively independent 
of response factors, is the method of "inspection time" 
(IT). In the standard version of  this paradigm (Nettelbeck, 
1987; Vickers, Nettelbeck & Wilson,  1972), two vertical 
lines are shown very briefly on each trial, followed by a 
pattern  mask;  the  subject  must judge  which  line  was 
shorter. For a given subject, IT is defined as the minimum 
exposure duration (up to the onset of  the mask) for which 
the lines must be displayed if he or she is to meet a pre- 
established criterion of accuracy--e.g., nine correct trials 
out of ten. 
Inspection times defined in this way are consistently 
correlated with measures of  psychometric intelligence. In 
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ported an overall correlation of-.30 between IQ scores 
and IT; this rose to -.55 when corrected for measurement 
error and attenuation. More recent findings confirm this 
general result (e.g., Bates & Eysenck, 1993; Deary, 1993). 
IT usually correlates best with performance subtests of 
intelligence;  its  correlation  with  verbal  intelligence  is 
usually weaker and sometimes zero. 
One apparent advantage of IT over other chrono- 
metric methods is that the task itself seems particularly 
simple. At first glance, it is hard to imagine that any dif- 
ferences in  response  strategies  or  stimulus  familiarity 
could affect the outcome. Nevertheless, it seems that they 
do. Brian Mackenzie and his colleagues (e.g., Mackenzie, 
Molloy, Martin, Lovegrove, & McNicol, 1991) discovered 
that some subjects use apparent-movement cues in the 
basic IT task while others do not; only in the latter group 
is IT correlated with intelligence test scores. Moreover, 
standard  IT  paradigms  require  an  essentially  spatial 
judgment; it is not surprising, then, that they correlate 
with  intelligence tests which  emphasize  spatial  ability. 
With this in mind, Mackenzie et al. (1991) devised a ver- 
balinspection time task based on Posner's classical same- 
letter/different-letter  paradigm (Posner, Boies, Eichetman, 
& Taylor, 1969). As predicted, the resulting ITs correlated 
with verbal but not with spatial intelligence. It is clear 
that the apparently simple IT task actually involves com- 
plex modes of information processing (cf. Chaiken,  1993) 
that are as yet poorly understood. 
Neurological  measures.  Recent  research  has 
begun to explore what seem to be still more direct indices 
of neural processing. Reed and Jensen (1992) have used 
measures based on visual evoked potentials (VEP) to as- 
sess what they call "nerve conduction velocity" (NCV). 
To estimate that velocity, distance is divided by time: each 
subject's head length (a rough measure of the distance 
from the eye to the primary visual cortex) is divided by 
the latency of an early component (N70 or P 100) of his 
or her evoked potential pattern. In a study with 147 col- 
lege-student subjects, these NCVs correlated r =  .26 with 
scores on an unspeeded test of intelligence. (A statistical 
correction for the restricted range of subjects raised the 
correlation to .37.) Other researchers have also reported 
correlations between VEP parameters and intelligence test 
scores (Caryl,  1994).  Interestingly,  however,  Reed  and 
Jensen  (1993)  reported that  their estimates  of "nerve 
conduction velocity" were not correlated with the same 
subjects' choice reaction times. Thus while we do not yet 
understand the basis of  the correlation between NCV and 
psychometric intelligence, it is apparently not just a mat- 
ter of overall speed. 
Problems of interpretation.  Some researchers 
believe that psychometric intelligence, especially g, de- 
pends directly on what may be called the "neural effi- 
ciency" of the brain (Eysenck, 1986; Vernon, 1987). They 
regard the observed correlations between test scores and 
measures of processing speed as evidence for their view. 
If choice reaction times, inspection times, and VEP la- 
tencies actually do reflect the speed of basic neural pro- 
cesses, such correlations are only to be expected. In fact, 
however, the observed patterns of correlation are rarely 
as simple as this hypothesis would predict. Moreover, it 
is quite possible that high- and low-IQ individuals differ 
in other ways that affect speeded performance (cf. Ceci, 
1990). Those variables include motivation, response cri- 
teria (emphasis on speed vs. accuracy), perceptual strat- 
egies (cf. Mackenzie et al.,  1991), attentional strategies, 
and--in  some  caseskdifferential  familiarity  with  the 
material itself. Finally, we do not yet know the direction 
of causation  that  underlies such correlations. Do high 
levels of "neural efficiency" promote the development of 
intelligence,  or do more intelligent people simply find 
faster ways to carry out perceptual tasks? Or both? These 
questions are still open. 
3. The Genes and Intelligence 
In this section of the report we first discuss individual 
differences generally, without reference to any particular 
trait. We then focus on intelligence, as measured by con- 
ventional  IQ tests or other tests intended to measure 
general cognitive ability. The different and  more con- 
troversial topic of group differences will be considered 
in Section 5. 
We focus here on the relative contributions of  genes 
and environments to individual differences in particular 
traits. To avoid misunderstanding, it must be emphasized 
from the outset that gene action always involves an en- 
vironment-at least a biochemical environment, and of- 
ten an ecological one. (For humans, that ecology is usually 
interpersonal or cultural.) Thus all genetic effects on the 
development of observable traits are potentially modifi- 
able by environmental input, though the practicability of 
making such modifications may be another matter. Con- 
versely, all environmental effects on trait development in- 
volve the genes or structures to which  the genes have 
contributed. Thus there is always a genetic aspect to the 
effects of  the environment (cf. Plomin & Bergeman, 1991). 
Sources of Individual Differences 
Partitioning  the  variation.  Individuals  differ 
from one another on a  wide variety of traits:  familiar 
examples include height, intelligence, and aspects of per- 
sonality. Those differences are often of considerable social 
importance.  Many  interesting questions  can  be  asked 
about their nature and origins. One such question is the 
extent to which they reflect differences among the genes 
of the individuals involved, as distinguished from differ- 
ences among the environments to which those individuals 
have been exposed. The issue here is not whether genes 
and environments are both essential for the development 
of a given trait (this is always the case), and it is not about 
the genes or environment of any particular person. We 
are concerned only with the observed variation of the 
trait across individuals in a  given population.  A  figure 
called the "heritability" (h  2) of the trait represents the 
proportion of  that variation that is associated with genetic 
differences among the individuals.  The remaining vari- 
ation ( 1 -  h 2) is associated with environmental differences 
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be estimated by various methods described below. 
Sometimes special interest attaches to those aspects 
of environments that family members have in common 
(for example, characteristics of the home). The part of 
the variation that derives from this source, called "shared" 
variation or c  ~, can also be estimated. Still more refined 
estimates can be made: c 2 is sometimes subdivided into 
several kinds of shared variation; h 2 is sometimes sub- 
divided into so-called "additive" and "nonadditive" por- 
tions (the part that is transmissible from parent to child 
vs. the part expressed anew in each generation by a unique 
patterning of genes.) Variation associated with correla- 
tions and statistical interactions between genes and en- 
vironments may also be identifiable. In theory, any of  the 
above estimates may vary with the age of the individuals 
involved. 
A high heritability does not mean that the environ- 
ment has no impact on the development of  a trait, or that 
learning is not involved. Vocabulary size, for example, is 
very substantially heritable (and highly correlated with 
general psychometric intelligence) although every word 
in an individual's vocabulary is learned. In a society in 
which plenty of words are available in everyone's envi- 
ronment-especially for individuals who are motivated 
to seek them out--the number of words that individuals 
actually learn depends to a considerable extent on their 
genetic predispositions. 
Behavior geneticists have often emphasized the fact 
that individuals can be active in creating or selecting their 
own environments. Some describe this process as active 
or reactive genotype-environment correlation (Plomin, 
DeFries, &  Loehlin,  1977). (The distinction is between 
the action of the organism in selecting its own environ- 
ment and the reaction of others to its gene-based traits.) 
Others suggest that these forms of gene-environment re- 
lationship are typical of the way that genes are normally 
expressed, and simply include them as part ofthe genetic 
effect (Roberts, 1967). This is a matter of terminological 
preference, not a dispute about facts. 
How  genetic estimates are  made.  Estimates 
of the magnitudes of these sources of individual differ- 
ences are made by exploiting natural and social "exper- 
iments" that  combine genotypes and environments in 
informative ways. Monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) 
twins,  for example, can be regarded as experiments of 
nature. MZ twins are paired individuals of the same age 
growing up in the same family who have all their genes 
in common; DZ twins are otherwise similar pairs who 
have only half their genes in common. Adoptions, in con- 
trast, are experiments of society. They allow one to com- 
pare genetically unrelated persons who are growing up 
in the same family as well as genetically related persons 
who are growing up in different families. They can also 
provide information about genotype-environment cor- 
relations: in ordinary families genes and environments 
are correlated because the same parents provide both, 
whereas in adoptive families one set of parents provides 
the genes and another the environment. An experiment 
involving both nature and society is the study of mono- 
zygotic twins  who have been reared apart  (Bouchard, 
Lykken,  McGue,  Segal,  &  TeUegen,  1990;  Pedersen, 
Plomin, Nesselroade, & McClearn, 1992). Relationships 
in the families of monozygotic twins also offer unique 
possibilities for analysis (e.g., R. J. Rose, Harris, Christian, 
& Nance,  1979). Because these comparisons are subject 
to different sources of  potential error, the results of  studies 
involving several kinds of kinship are often analyzed to- 
gether to arrive at robust overall conclusions. (For general 
discussions  of behavior genetic  methods,  see  Plomin, 
DeFries, & McClearn,  1990, or Hay, 1985.) 
Results for IQ Scores 
Parameter estimates.  Across the ordinary range 
of environments in modern Western societies, a sizable 
part of  the variation in intelligence test scores is associated 
with genetic differences among individuals. Quantitative 
estimates vary from one study to another, because many 
are based  on small or selective samples.  If one simply 
combines all available correlations in a  single analysis, 
the heritability (h  2) works out to about .50 and the be- 
tween-family variance (c  2) to about  .25  (e.g.,  Chipuer, 
Rovine, & Plomin,  1990; Loehlin,  1989). These overall 
figures are misleading, however, because most of the rel- 
evant studies have been done with children. We now know 
that the heritability of IQ changes with age: h 2 goes up 
and c  2 goes down from infancy to adulthood (McCartney, 
Harris, & Bernieri, 1990; McGue, Bouchard, Iacono, & 
Lykken, 1993). In childhood h 2 and c 2 for IQ are of the 
order of .45 and .35; by late adolescence h 2 is around .75 
and c 2 is quite low (zero in  some studies).  Substantial 
environmental variance remains, but it primarily reflects 
within-family rather than between-family differences. 
These  adult  parameter  estimates  are  based  on  a 
number of independent studies. The correlation between 
MZ  twins  reared  apart,  which  directly estimates  h2, 
ranged from .68 to .78 in five studies involving adult sam- 
pies from Europe and the United States (McGue et al., 
1993). The correlation between unrelated children reared 
together in adoptive families, which directly estimates c  2, 
was approximately zero for adolescents in two adoption 
studies  (Loehlin,  Horn,  &  Willerman,  1989;  Scarr  & 
Weinberg, 1978) and. 19 in a third (the Minnesota trans- 
racial  adoption  study:  Scarr,  Weinberg,  &  Waldman, 
1993). 
These particular estimates derive from samples in 
which the lowest socioeconomic levels were under-rep- 
resented (i.e., there were few very poor families), so the 
range of between-family differences was smaller than in 
the population as a whole. This means that we should be 
cautious in generalizing the findings for between-family 
effects across the entire social spectrum. The samples were 
also mostly White, but available data suggest that twin 
and sibling correlations in African American and similarly 
selected White samples are more often comparable than 
not (Loehlin, Lindzey, & Spuhler,  1975). 
Why should individual differences in intelligence (as 
measured by test scores) reflect genetic differences more 
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is that as individuals grow older their transactions with 
their  environments  are  increasingly  influenced  by the 
characteristics  that  they  bring  to  those  environments 
themselves, decreasingly by the conditions  imposed by 
family life and social origins. Older persons are in a better 
position to select their own effective environments, a form 
of genotype-environment  correlation.  In  any  case  the 
popular view that genetic influences on the development 
of a  trait are essentially frozen at conception while the 
effects of the early environment cumulate inexorably is 
quite  misleading,  at least for the trait  of psychometric 
intelligence. 
Implications.  Estimates  of h 2  and  c 2 for IQ (or 
any other trait) are descriptive statistics for the populations 
studied. (In this respect they are like means and standard 
deviations.) They are outcome measures, summarizing 
the results of a great many diverse, intricate, individually 
variable events and processes, but they can nevertheless 
be quite useful. They can tell us how much of  the variation 
in a given trait the genes and family environments explain, 
and changes in them place some constraints on theories 
of how this occurs. On the other hand they have little to 
say about specific mechanisms,  i.e.,  about how genetic 
and environmental  differences get translated  into  indi- 
vidual physiological and psychological differences. Many 
psychologists and  neuroscientists  are  actively studying 
such processes; data on heritabilities may give them ideas 
about what to look for and where or when to look for it. 
A  common error is to assume that because some- 
thing is heritable it is necessarily unchangeable.  This is 
wrong. Heritability does not imply immutability. As pre- 
viously noted,  heritable  traits can depend  on learning, 
and they may be subject to other environmental effects 
as well. The value of h 2 can change if the distribution of 
environments (or genes) in the population is substantially 
altered.  On the other hand,  there can be effective envi- 
ronmental changes that do not change heritability at all. 
If the environment relevant to a given trait improves in 
a way that affects all members of the population equally, 
the mean value of the trait will rise without any change 
in its heritability (because the differences among individ- 
uals in the population will stay the same). This has evi- 
dently happened for height: the heritability of stature is 
high,  but average heights  continue to increase (Olivier, 
1980). Something of the sort may also be taking place for 
IQ scores--the so-called "Flynn effect" discussed in Sec- 
tion 4. 
In theory, different subgroups of a population might 
have different distributions of environments or genes and 
hence different values of h 2. This seems not to be the case 
for high and low IQ levels, for which adult heritabilities 
appear to be much the same (Saudino, Plomin, Pedersen, 
& McClearn,  1994).  It is also possible that an impover- 
ished  or suppressive environment could fail to support 
the development of a trait, and hence restrict individual 
variation. This could affect estimates of h 2, c 2, or both, 
depending on the details of the process. Again (as in the 
case of whole populations), an environmental factor that 
affected every member of a subgroup equally might alter 
the group's mean without affecting heritabilities at all. 
Where  the  heritability  of IQ is  concerned,  it  has 
sometimes seemed as if the findings based on differences 
between group means were in contradiction  with those 
based on correlations. For example, children adopted in 
infancy into advantaged families tend to have higher IQs 
in childhood than would have been expected if they had 
been reared by their birth mothers; this is a mean differ- 
ence implicating the environment. Yet at the same time 
their individual resemblance to their birth mothers per- 
sists, and this correlation is most plausibly interpreted in 
genetic  terms.  There is  no  real  contradiction:  the  two 
findings simply call attention to different aspects of the 
same phenomenon. A sensible account must include both 
aspects: there is only a single developmental process, and 
it occurs in individuals.  By looking at means or corre- 
lations  one  learns  somewhat  different  but  compatible 
things about the genetic and environmental contributions 
to that process (Turkheimer,  1991). 
As far as behavior genetic methods are concerned, 
there is nothing unique about psychometric intelligence 
relative to other traits or abilities. Any reliably measured 
trait can be analyzed by these methods, and many traits 
including personality and attitudes have been. The meth- 
ods are neutral with regard to genetic and environmental 
sources of variance:  if individual  differences on  a  trait 
are  entirely due  to environmental  factors,  the  analysis 
will  reveal this.  These methods have shown that genes 
contribute  substantially to individual  differences in  in- 
telligence test performance, and that their role seems to 
increase from infancy to adulthood. They have also shown 
that variations in the unique environments of individuals 
are important,  and that  between-family variation con- 
tributes significantly to observed differences in IQ scores 
in childhood although this effect diminishes later on. All 
these conclusions are wholly consistent with the notion 
that  both  genes  and  environment,  in  complex  inter- 
play,  are  essential  to  the  development  of intellectual 
competence. 
4. Environmental  Effects an Intelligence 
The "environment" includes a wide range of influences 
on intelligence. Some of those variables affect whole pop- 
ulations, while others contribute to individual differences 
within a given group. Some of them are social, some are 
biological; at this point some are still mysterious. It may 
also happen that the proper interpretation of an environ- 
mental variable requires the simultaneous consideration 
of genetic effects. Nevertheless, a  good deal of solid in- 
formation is available. 
Social Variables 
It is obvious that the cultural environment--how people 
live, what  they value,  what  they  do--has  a  significant 
effect on the intellectual skills developed by individuals. 
Rice farmers in Liberia are good at estimating quantities 
of rice (Gay & Cole,  1967); children in Botswana, accus- 
tomed to story-telling, have excellent memories for stories 
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ican controls on the tasks in question. On the other hand 
Americans and other Westernized groups typically out- 
perform members of  traditional societies on psychometric 
tests, even those designed to be "culture-fair." 
Cultures typically differ from one another in so many 
ways that particular differences can rarely be ascribed to 
single causes. Even comparisons between subpopulations 
can be difficult to interpret. If we find that middle-class 
and poor Americans differ in their scores on intelligence 
tests, it is easy to suppose that the environmental differ- 
ence has caused the IQ difference (i.e., that growing up 
in the middle class produces higher psychometric intel- 
ligence than growing up poor). But there may also be an 
opposite direction of causation: individuals can come to 
be in one environment or another because of differences 
in their own abilities. Waller (1971) has shown, for ex- 
ample, that adult sons whose IQ scores are above those 
of  their fathers tend to have higher social-class status than 
those fathers; conversely, sons with IQ scores below their 
fathers' tend to have lower social-class status.  Since all 
the subjects grew up with their fathers, the IQ differences 
in this study cannot have resulted from class-related dif- 
ferences in childhood experience. Rather, those differences 
(or other factors correlated with them) seem to have had 
an influence on the status that they achieved. Such a result 
is not surprising, given the relation between test scores 
and years of education reviewed in Section 2. 
Occupation.  In Section 2 we noted that intelli- 
gence test scores predict occupational level, not only be- 
cause some occupations require more intelligence than 
others but also because admission to many professions 
depends on test scores in the first place. There can also 
be an effect in the opposite direction, i.e., workplaces may 
affect the intelligence of those who work in them. Kohn 
and Schooler (1973), who interviewed some 3,000 men 
in various occupations (farmers, managers, machinists, 
porters, etc.), argued that more "complex" jobs produce 
more "intellectual flexibility" in the individuals who hold 
them. Although the issue of direction of effects was not 
fully resolved in their study--and perhaps not even in its 
longitudinal  follow-up (Kohn  &  Scho01er,  1983)--this 
remains a plausible suggestion. 
Among other things, Kohn and Schooler's hypothesis 
may help us understand urban/rural differences. A gen- 
eration ago these were substantial in the United States, 
averaging about 6 IQ points or 0.4 standard deviations 
(Terman & Merrill, 1937; Seashore, Wesman, & Doppelt, 
1950). In recent years the difference has declined to about 
2 points (Kaufman & Doppelt, 1976; Reynolds, Chastain, 
Kaufman, & McLean, 1987). In all likelihood this urban/ 
rural  convergence  primarily  reflects  environmental 
changes: a decrease in rural isolation (due to increased 
travel and  mass communications), an improvement in 
rural schools, the greater use of technology on farms. All 
these changes can be regarded as increasing the "com- 
plexity" of the rural environment in general or of farm 
work in particular.  (However, processes with a  genetic 
component--e.g., changes in the selectivity of migration 
from farm to city--cannot be completely excluded as 
contributing factors.) 
Schooling.  Attendance at school is both a depen- 
dent and an independent variable in relation to intelli- 
gence. On the one hand, children with higher test scores 
are less likely to drop out and more likely to be promoted 
from grade to grade and then to attend college. Thus the 
number  of years of education that  adults  complete is 
roughly predictable from their childhood scores on in- 
telligence tests. On the other hand, schooling itself changes 
mental  abilities,  including those  abilities measured  on 
psychometric tests. This is obvious for tests like the SAT 
that are explicitly designed to assess school learning, but 
it is almost equally true of intelligence tests themselves. 
The evidence for the effect of schooling on intelli- 
gence test scores takes many forms (Ceci,  1991). When 
children of nearly the same age go through school a year 
apart  (because  of birthday-related admission  criteria), 
those who have been in school longer have higher mean 
scores. Children who attend school intermittently score 
below those who go regularly, and test performance tends 
to drop over the summer vacation. A  striking demon- 
stration of this effect appeared when the schools in one 
Virginia county closed for several years in the  1960s to 
avoid integration, leaving most Black children with no 
formal education at all. Compared to controls, the intel- 
ligence-test scores of  these children dropped by about 0.4 
standard deviations (6 points) per missed year of school 
(Green, Hoffman, Morse, Hayes, & Morgan,  1964). 
Schools affect intelligence in several ways, most ob- 
viously  by  transmitting  information.  The  answers  to 
questions like "Who wrote Hamlet?" and "What is the 
boiling point of water?" are typically learned in school, 
where some pupils learn them more easily and thoroughly 
than others. Perhaps at least as important are certain gen- 
eral skills and attitudes: systematic problem-solving, ab- 
stract  thinking,  categorization,  sustained  attention  to 
material of little intrinsic interest, and repeated mani- 
pulation of basic symbols and operations.  There is no 
doubt that schools promote and permit the development 
of  significant intellectual skills, which develop to different 
extents in different children. It is because tests of intel- 
ligence draw on many of  those same skills that they predict 
school achievement as well as they do. 
To achieve these results, the school experience must 
meet at least some minimum standard of quality. In very 
poor schools, children may learn so little that they fall 
farther behind the national IQ norms for every year of 
attendance. When this happens, older siblings have sys- 
tematically lower scores than their younger counterparts. 
This  pattern  of scores  appeared  in  at  least  one  rural 
Georgia school system in the 1970s (Jensen, 1977). Before 
desegregation, it must have been characteristic of many 
of the schools attended by Black pupils in the South. In 
a study based on Black children who had moved to Phil- 
adelphia at various ages during this period, Lee (1951) 
found that their IQ scores went up more than halfa point 
for each year that they were enrolled in the Philadelphia 
system. 
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child's standing relative to others in his or her age cohort. 
Very poor or interrupted schooling can lower that standing 
substantially; are there also ways to raise it? In fact many 
interventions have been shown to raise test scores and 
mental ability "in the short run" (i.e., while the program 
itself was in progress), but long-run gains have proved 
more elusive. One noteworthy example of(at least short- 
run)  success  was  the  Venezuelan  Intelligence  Project 
(Herrnstein, Nickerson, de Sanchez, & Swets,  1986), in 
which hundreds of seventh-grade children from under- 
privileged backgrounds in that country were exposed to 
an extensive, theoretically-based curriculum focused on 
thinking  skills.  The intervention produced  substantial 
gains on a  wide  range of tests,  but there has been  no 
follow-up. 
Children who participate in "Head Start" and sim- 
ilar programs are exposed to various school-related ma- 
terials and experiences for one or two years. Their test 
scores often go up during the course of the program, but 
these gains  fade with  time.  By the  end  of elementary 
school, there are usually no significant IQ or achievement- 
test differences between children who have been in such 
programs and controls who have not. There may, however, 
be other differences. Follow-up studies suggest that chil- 
dren who participated in such programs as preschoolers 
are less likely to be assigned  to special education,  less 
likely to be held back in grade, and more l~ely to finish 
high school than matched controls (Consortium for Lon- 
gitudinal  Studies,  1983;  Darlington,  1986; but see Lo- 
curto,  1991). 
More extensive interventions might be expected to 
produce larger and more lasting effects, but few such pro- 
grams  have been  evaluated  systematically. One  of the 
more  successful  is  the  Carolina  Abecedarian  Project 
(Campbell & Ramey,  1994), which provided a group of 
children with enriched environments from early infancy 
through preschool and also maintained appropriate con- 
trols. The test scores of the enrichment-group children 
were already higher than  those of controls at age two; 
they were still some 5 points higher at age 12, seven years 
after the  end of the intervention.  Importantly, the  en- 
richment group also outperformed the controls in aca- 
demic achievement. 
Family environment.  No one doubts that normal 
child development requires a certain minimum level of 
responsible care. Severely deprived, neglectful, or abusive 
environments must have negative effects on a great many 
aspects--including intellectual aspects--of development. 
Beyond that minimum,  however, the role of family ex- 
perience  is  now  in  serious  dispute  (Baumrind,  1993; 
Jackson,  1993; Scarr,  1992,  1993). Psychometric intelli- 
gence is a case in point. Do differences between children's 
family environments (within the normal range) produce 
differences in  their intelligence test performance? The 
problem here is to disentangle causation from correlation. 
There is no doubt that such variables as resources of the 
home (Gottfried, 1984) and parents' use of  language (Hart 
&  Risley,  1992, in press) are correlated with children's 
IQ scores, but such correlations may be mediated by ge- 
netic as well as (or instead of) environmental factors. 
Behavior geneticists frame such issues in quantitative 
terms. As noted in Section 3, environmental factors cer- 
tainly contribute to the overall variance of psychometric 
intelligence. But how much of that variance results from 
differences between families, as contrasted with the vary- 
ing experiences of different children in the same family? 
Between-family differences create what is called "shared 
variance" or c 2 (all children in a family share the same 
home and the same parents). Recent twin and adoption 
studies suggest that while the value of c 2 (for IQ scores) 
is substantial in early childhood, it becomes quite small 
by late adolescence. 
These findings  suggest  that  differences in  the  life 
styles of families--whatever their importance may be for 
many aspects of children's lives--make little long-term 
difference for the skills measured by intelligence tests. We 
should note, however, that low-income and non-White 
families are poorly represented in existing adoption stud- 
ies as well as in most twin samples.  Thus it is not yet 
clear whether these surprisingly small values of (adoles- 
cent) c 2 apply to the population as a whole. It remains 
possible that, across the full range of  income and ethnicity, 
between-family  differences  have  more  lasting  conse- 
quences for psychometric intelligence. 
Biological Variables 
Every individual has a biological as well as a social en- 
vironment,  one that  begins  in  the womb  and  extends 
throughout life. Many aspects of that environment can 
affect intellectual  development.  We  now  know  that  a 
number of  biological factors--malnutrition, exposure to 
toxic substances,  various prenatal and perinatal stress- 
ors--result in lowered psychometric intelligence under 
at least some conditions. 
Nutrition.  There has been only one major study 
of the effects of prenatal malnutrition (i.e., malnutrition 
of  the mother during pregnancy) on long-term intellectual 
development. Stein, Susser, Saenger, and Marolla (1975) 
analyzed the test scores of Dutch  19-year-old males in 
relation to a  wartime famine that had occurred in the 
winter of 1944-45, just before their birth. In this very 
large sample (made possible by a  universal military in- 
duction requirement),  exposure to the famine had  no 
effect on adult intelligence. Note, however, that the famine 
itself lasted only a few months; the subjects were exposed 
to it prenatally but not after birth. 
In  contrast,  prolonged malnutrition during child- 
hood does have long-term intellectual effects. These have 
not been easy to establish, in part because many other 
unfavorable  socioeconomic conditions  are  often  asso- 
ciated with chronic malnutrition (Ricciuti,  1993; but cf. 
Sigman,  1995). In one intervention study, however, pre- 
schoolers in two Guatemalan villages (where undernour- 
ishment is common) were given ad lib access to a protein 
dietary supplement for several years. A decade later, many 
of these children (namely, those from the poorest socio- 
economic levels) scored significantly higher on school- 
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litt,  Gorman,  Engle,  Martorell,  &  Rivera,  1993).  It is 
worth noting that the effects of poor nutrition on intel- 
ligence may well be indirect. Malnourished children are 
typically less responsive to adults, less motivated to learn, 
and less active in exploration than their more adequately 
nourished counterparts. 
Although  the  degree of malnutrition  prevalent in 
these villages rarely occurs in the  United  States,  there 
may  still  be  nutritional  influences  on  intelligence.  In 
studies  of  so-called  "micro-nutrients,"  experimental 
groups of children have been given vitamin/mineral sup- 
plements while controls got placebos. In many of these 
studies  (e.g.,  Schoenthaler,  Amos,  Eysenck,  Peritz,  & 
Yudkin,  1991), the experimental children showed test- 
score gains that significantly exceeded the controls. In a 
somewhat different design, Rush, Stein, Susser, and Brody 
(1980)  gave  dietary  supplements  of liquid  protein  to 
pregnant women who were thought to be at risk for de- 
livering low birth-weight babies. At one year of age, the 
babies born to these mothers showed faster habituation 
to visual patterns than did control infants. (Other research 
has  shown  that  infant habituation  rates  are  positively 
correlated with later psychometric test scores: Columbo, 
1993.) Although these results are encouraging, there has 
been no long-term follow-up of such gains. 
Lead.  Certain toxins have well-established negative 
effects on intelligence. Exposure to lead is one such factor. 
In one long-term study (Baghurst et al., 1992; McMichael 
et al., 1988), the blood lead levels of children growing up 
near a  lead smelting plant were substantially and nega- 
tively correlated with intelligence test scores throughout 
childhood. No "threshold dose" for the effect of lead ap- 
pears in such studies.  Although ambient lead levels in 
the United States have been reduced in recent years, there 
is reason to believe that some American children--es- 
pecially those in inner cities--may still be at risk from 
this source (cf. Needleman, Geiger, & Frank,  1985). 
Alcohol.  Extensive prenatal exposure to alcohol 
(which occurs if the mother drinks heavily during preg- 
nancy) can  give rise to fetal alcohol  syndrome, which 
includes mental retardation as well as a range of physical 
symptoms. Smaller "doses" of  prenatal alcohol may have 
negative effects on intelligence even when the full syn- 
drome  does  not  appear.  Streissguth,  Barr,  Sampson, 
Darby, and Martin (1989) found that mothers who re- 
ported consuming more than 1.5 oz. of  alcohol daily dur- 
ing pregnancy had children who scored some  5 points 
below controls at age four. Prenatal exposure to aspirin 
and antibiotics had similar negative effects in this study. 
Perinatal factors.  Complications at delivery and 
other negative perinatal factors may have serious conse- 
quences for development. Nevertheless, because they oc- 
cur only rarely, they contribute relatively little to the pop- 
ulation  variance  of intelligence  (Broman,  Nichols,  & 
Kennedy, 1975). Down's syndrome, a chromosomal ab- 
normality that produces serious mental retardation,  is 
also rare enough to have little impact on the overall dis- 
tribution of test scores. 
The correlation between birth weight and later in- 
telligence deserves particular discussion.  In some cases 
low birth weight simply reflects premature delivery; in 
others, the infant's size is below normal for its gestational 
age. Both factors apparently contribute to the tendency 
of low-birth-weight infants to have lower test scores in 
later childhood (Lubchenko,  1976). These correlations 
are small,  ranging from  .05  to  . 13  in  different groups 
(Broman et al., 1975). The effects of low birth weight are 
substantial only when it is very low indeed (less than 1,500 
gm).  Premature  babies  born  at  these  very  low  birth 
weights are behind controls on most developmental mea- 
sures; they often have severe or permanent intellectual 
deficits (Rosetti, 1986). 
Continuously Rising Test Scores 
Perhaps the most striking of all environmental effects is 
the steady worldwide rise in intelligence test performance. 
Although many psychometricians had noted these gains, 
it was James Flynn (1984, 1987) who first described them 
systematically. His analysis shows that performance has 
been going up ever since testing began. The "Flynn effect" 
is now very well documented, not  only in the United 
States but in many other technologically advanced coun- 
tries. The average gain is about 3 IQ points per decade-- 
more than a full standard deviation since, say,  1940. 
Although it is simplest to describe the gains as in- 
creases in population IQ, this is not exactly what happens. 
Most intelligence tests are "restandardized" from time 
to time, in part to keep up with these very gains. As part 
of  this process the mean score of  the new standardization 
sample is typically set to 100 again, so the increase more 
or less disappears from view. In this context, the Flynn 
effect means that if 20 years have passed since the last 
time the test was standardized, people who now score 100 
on the new version would probably average about 106 on 
the old one. 
The sheer extent of these increases is remarkable, 
and the rate of gain may even be increasing. The scores 
of 19-year-olds in the Netherlands, for example, went up 
more than  8  points--over half a  standard deviation-- 
between  1972 and  1982. What's more, the largest gains 
appear on the types of  tests that were specifically designed 
to be free of cultural  influence (Flynn,  1987).  One  of 
these is Raven's Progressive Matrices, an untimed non- 
verbal ¢~est that many psychometricians regard as a good 
measure of g. 
These steady gains in intelligence test performance 
have  not  always  been  accompanied  by  corresponding 
gains in school achievement. Indeed, the relation between 
intelligence and achievement test scores can be complex. 
This is especially true  for the Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT), in part because the ability range of the students 
who take the SAT has broadened over time. That change 
explains some portionmnot all--of the prolonged decline 
in SAT scores that took place from the mid-1960s to the 
early  1980s,  even as IQ scores were continuing to rise 
(Flynn,  1984).  Meanwhile,  however, other more repre- 
sentative measures show that school achievement levels 
February 1996  •  American Psychologist  89 have  held  steady  or  in  some  cases  actually  increased 
(Herrnstein & Murray,  1994). The National Assessment 
of  Educational Progress (NAEP), for example, shows that 
the average reading and math achievement of American 
13- and 17-year-olds improved somewhat from the early 
1970s to 1990 (Grissmer, Kirby, Berends, & Williamson, 
1994). An analysis of  these data by ethnic group, reported 
in Section 5, shows that this small overall increase actually 
reflects  very substantial  gains  by  Blacks  and  Latinos 
combined with little or no gain by Whites. 
The consistent IQ gains documented by Flynn seem 
much too large to result from simple increases in test 
sophistication.  Their cause  is  presently unknown,  but 
three interpretations deserve our consideration. Perhaps 
the most plausible of  these is based on the striking cultural 
differences between successive generations. Daily life and 
occupational  experience  both  seem  more  "complex" 
(Kohn & Schooler, 1973) today than in the time of our 
parents and grandparents. The population is increasingly 
urbanized; television exposes us to more information and 
more perspectives on more topics than ever before; chil- 
dren stay in school longer; and almost everyone seems to 
be encountering new forms of experience. These changes 
in the complexity of life may have produced correspond- 
ing changes in complexity of mind, and hence in certain 
psychometric abilities. 
A different hypothesis attributes the gains to modem 
improvements in nutrition. Lynn (1990) points out that 
large nutritionally-based increases in height have occurred 
during the same period as the IQ gains:  perhaps there 
have been increases in brain size as well. As we have seen, 
however, the effects of nutrition on intelligence are them- 
selves not firmly established. 
The third interpretation addresses the very definition 
of intelligence. Flynn himself believes that  real intelli- 
gence-whatever it may be--cannot have increased as 
much as these data would suggest. Consider, for example, 
the number of individuals who have IQ scores of 140 or 
more. (This is slightly above the cutoff used by L.  M. 
Terman [1925] in his famous longitudinal study of "ge- 
nius.") In  1952 only 0.38% of Dutch test takers had IQs 
over 140; in 1982, scored by the same norms, 9.12% ex- 
ceeded this figure! Judging by these criteria, the Nether- 
lands should now be experiencing "a cultural renaissance 
too great to be overlooked" (Flynn, 1987, p. 187). So too 
should  France,  Norway,  the  United  States,  and  many 
other countries. Because Flynn (1987) finds this conclu- 
sion implausible or absurd, he argues that what has risen 
cannot be intelligence itself but only a minor sort of"ab- 
stract  problem  solving  ability."  The  issue  remains 
unresolved. 
Individual Life Experiences 
Although the environmental variables that produce large 
differences in intelligence are  not yet well understood, 
genetic studies assure us that they exist. With a heritability 
well below 1.00, IQ must be subject to substantial envi- 
ronmental influences. Moreover, available heritability es- 
timates apply only within the range of  environments that 
are well-represented in the present population. We already 
know that some relatively rare conditions, like those re- 
viewed earlier, have large negative effects on intelligence. 
Whether there are (now equally rare) conditions that have 
large positive effects is not known. 
As we have seen, there is both a  biological and a 
social environment. For any given child, the social factors 
include not only an overall cultural/social/school setting 
and a particular family but also a unique "micro-envi- 
ronment" of experiences that are shared with no one else. 
The adoption studies  reviewed in  Section 3  show that 
family variables--differences in parenting style, in  the 
resources of the home, etc.--have smaller long-term ef- 
fects than we once supposed. At least among people who 
share a given SES level and a given culture, it seems to 
be unique individual experience that makes the largest 
environmental contribution to adult IQ differences. 
We do not yet know what the key features of those 
micro-environments may be. Are they biological? Social? 
Chronic? Acute? Is there something especially important 
in the earliest relations between the infant and its care- 
takers? Whatever the critical variables may be, do they 
interact with other aspects of family life? Of culture? At 
this point we cannot say, but these questions offer a fertile 
area for further research. 
5. Group Differences 
Group means have no direct implications for individuals. 
What matters for the next person you meet (to the extent 
that test scores matter at all) is that person's own partic- 
ular score, not the mean of  some reference group to which 
he or she happens to belong. The commitment to evaluate 
people on their own individual merit is central to a dem- 
ocratic society. It also makes quantitative sense. The dis- 
tributions of different groups inevitably overlap, with the 
range of scores within any one group always wider than 
the mean differences between any two groups. In the case 
of intelligence test scores, the variance attributable to in- 
dividual differences far exceeds the variance related to 
group membership (Jensen,  1980). 
Because claims about ethnic differences have often 
been used to rationalize racial discrimination in the past, 
all such claims must be subjected to very careful scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, group differences continue to be the subject 
of intense interest and debate. There are many reasons 
for this interest: some are legal and political, some social 
and psychological. Among other things, facts about group 
differences may be relevant to the need for (and the ef- 
fectiveness of) affirmative action  programs.  But while 
some recent discussions of intelligence and ethnic differ- 
ences (e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) have made spe- 
cific policy recommendations in this area, we will not do 
so here. Such recommendations are necessarily based on 
political as well as scientific considerations, and so fall 
outside the scope of this report. 
Besides European Americans ("Whites"), the ethnic 
groups to be considered are Chinese and Japanese Amer- 
icans, Hispanic Americans ("Latinos"), Native Americans 
("Indians"),  and African Americans ("Blacks"). These 
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defined by social conventions based on ethnic origin as 
well as on observable physical characteristics such as skin 
color. None of them are internally homogeneous. Asian 
Americans, for example, may have roots in many different 
cultures: not only China and Japan but also Korea, Laos, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, India, and Pakistan. Hispanic 
Americans, who share a common linguistic tradition, ac- 
tually differ along many cultural dimensions. In their own 
minds they may be less "Latinos" than Puerto Ricans, 
Mexican Americans,  Cuban Americans,  or representa- 
fives of other Latin cultures.  "Native American" is an 
even more diverse category, including a great many cul- 
turally  distinct  tribes  living  in  a  wide  range  of 
environments. 
Although males and females are not ethnic or cul- 
tural groups, possible sex differences in cognitive ability 
have also been the subject of  widespread interest and dis- 
cussion.  For this reason, the evidence relevant to such 
differences is briefly reviewed in the next section. 
Sex Differences 
Most standard tests of intelligence have been constructed 
so that there are no overall score differences between fe- 
males and males. Some recent studies do report sex dif- 
ferences in IQ, but the direction is variable and the effects 
are small (Held, Alderton, Foley, & Segall,  1993; Lynn, 
1994). This overall equivalence does not imply equal per- 
formance on every individual ability. While some tasks 
show no sex differences, there are others where small dif- 
ferences  appear  and  a  few  where  they  are  large  and 
consistent. 
Spatial and quantitative abilities.  Large dif- 
ferences favoring males appear on visual-spatial tasks like 
mental rotation and spatiotemporal tasks like tracking a 
moving object through space (Law, Pellegrino, & Hunt, 
1993;  Linn  &  Petersen,  1985).  The  sex  difference on 
mental rotation tasks is substantial: a recent meta-analysis 
(Masters & Sanders, 1993) puts the effect size at d = 0.9. 
(Effect sizes are measured in  standard deviation units. 
Here, the mean  of the male distribution  is nearly one 
standard  deviation  above  that  for  females.)  Males' 
achievement levels on movement-related and visual-spa- 
tial tests are relevant to their generally better performance 
in tasks  that  involve aiming  and  throwing  (Jardine  & 
Martin,  1983). 
Some quantitative abilities also show consistent dif- 
ferences. Females have a clear advantage on quantitative 
tasks in the early years of school (Hyde, Fennema, & La- 
mon,  1990), but this reverses sometime before puberty; 
males then maintain their superior performance into old 
age.  The math  portion of the  Scholastic Aptitude  Test 
shows a substantial advantage for males (d = 0.33 to 0.50), 
with  many  more  males  scoring  in  the  highest  ranges 
(Benbow, 1988; Halpern, 1992). Males also score consis- 
tently higher on tests of  proportional and mechanical rea- 
soning (Meehan, 1984; Stanley, Benbow, Brody, Dauber, 
& Lupkowski,  1992). 
Verbal abilities.  Some verbal tasks  show sub- 
stantial mean differences favoring females. These include 
synonym generation  and  verbal  fluency (e.g.,  naming 
words that start with a given letter), with effect sizes rang- 
ing from d  =  0.5 to  1.2  (Gordon &  Lee,  1986; Hines, 
1990).  On  average  females  score  higher  on  college 
achievement tests in literature, English composition, and 
Spanish (Stanley,  1993); they also excel at reading and 
spelling. Many more males than females are diagnosed 
with  dyslexia  and  other  reading  disabilities  (Sutaria, 
1985), and there are many more male stutterers (Yairi & 
Ambrose,  1992). Some memory tasks also show better 
performance by females, but the size (and perhaps even 
the direction) of  the effect varies with the type of  memory 
being assessed. 
Causal factors.  There  are  both social and bio- 
logical reasons for these differences. At the  social level 
there are both subtle and overt differences between the 
experiences, expectations, and gender roles of females and 
males.  Relevant environmental differences appear soon 
after birth. They range from the gender-differentiated toys 
that children regularly receive to the expectations of adult 
life with which they are presented,  from gender-differ- 
entiated household and leisure activities to assumptions 
about  differences in  basic  ability.  Models that  include 
many of  these psychosocial variables have been successful 
in predicting academic achievement (Eccles, 1987). 
Many biological variables are also relevant. One fo- 
cus of current research is on differences in the sizes or 
shapes of particular neural structures. Numerous sexually 
dimorphic brain structures have now been identified, and 
they may well have implications for cognition. There are, 
for example, sex-related differences in the sizes of some 
portions of  the corpus callosum; these differences are cor- 
related  with  verbal  fluency  (Hines,  Chiu,  McAdams, 
Bentler, & Lipcamon, 1992). Recent brain imaging studies 
have found what may be differences in the lateralization 
of language (Shaywitz et al.,  1995). Note that such dif- 
ferences in neural structure could result from differences 
in patterns of life experience as well as from genetically- 
driven  mechanisms  of brain  development;  moreover, 
brain development and experience may have bidirectional 
effects on each other. This research area is still in a largely 
exploratory phase. 
Hormonal influences.  The importance of pre- 
natal exposure to sex hormones is well established. Hor- 
mones influence not only the  developing genitalia but 
also  the  brain  and  certain  immune  system  structures 
(Geschwind & Galaburda, 1987; Halpern & Cass, 1994). 
Several studies have tested individuals who were exposed 
to abnormally high androgen levels in utero, due to a 
condition  known  as  congenital  adrenal  hyperplasia 
(CAH). Adult CAH females score significantly higher than 
controls on tests of spatial ability (Resnick, Berenbaum, 
Gottesman & Bouchard, 1986); CAH girls play more with 
"boys' toys"  and  less  with  "girls'  toys" than  controls 
(Berenbaum & Hines,  1992). 
Other experimental paradigms confirm the relevance 
of sex hormones for performance levels in certain skills. 
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levels in normal males to be correlated positively (about 
.20) with some measures of spatial ability and negatively 
(about -.20) with some measures of verbal ability. Older 
males given testosterone show improved performance on 
visual-spatial tests (Janowsky, Oviatt, &  Orwoll,  1994). 
Many similar findings have been reported, though  the 
effects are often nonlinear and complex (Gouchie & Ki- 
mura, 1991; Nyborg, 1984). It is clear that any adequate 
model of sex differences in cognition will have to take 
both biological and psychological variables (and their in- 
teractions) into account. 
Mean Scores of Different Ethnic Groups 
Asian Americans.  In the years since the Second 
World  War,  Asian  Americans--especially  those  of 
Chinese  and  Japanese  extraction--have  compiled  an 
outstanding  record  of  academic  and  professional 
achievement. This record is reflected in school grades, in 
scores on content-oriented achievement tests like the SAT 
and GRE, and especially in the disproportionate repre- 
sentation  of Asian  Americans  in  many  sciences  and 
professions.  Although  it  is  often  supposed  that  these 
achievements reflect correspondingly high intelligence test 
scores, this is not the case. In more than a dozen studies 
from the 1960s and 1970s analyzed by Flynn (1991), the 
mean IQs of Japanese and Chinese American children 
were always around 97 or 98; none was over 100. Even 
Lynn (1993), who argues for a slightly higher figure, con- 
cedes that the achievements of  these Asian Americans far 
outstrip what might have been expected on the basis of 
their test scores. 
It may be worth noting that the interpretation of  test 
scores obtained by Asians in Asia has been controversial 
in its own right. Lynn (1982) reported a mean Japanese 
IQ of I 11 while Flynn (199 l) estimated it to be between 
101 and  105. Stevenson et al. (1985), comparing the in- 
telligence-test performance of children in Japan, Taiwan, 
and the United States, found no substantive differences 
at all. Given the general problems of cross-cultural com- 
parison, there is no reason to expect precision or stability 
in such estimates. Nevertheless, some interest attaches to 
these particular comparisons:  they show that  the well- 
established differences in school achievement among the 
same three groups (Chinese and Japanese children are 
much better at  math  than  American children) do  not 
simply reflect differences in  psychometric intelligence. 
Stevenson, Lee, and Stigler(1986) suggest that they result 
from structural differences in the schools of  the three na- 
tions as well as from varying cultural attitudes toward 
learning itself. It is also possible that spatial ability--in 
which  Japanese  and  Chinese  obtain  somewhat  higher 
scores than  Americans--plays  a  particular  role in  the 
learning of mathematics. 
One interesting way to assess the achievements of 
Chinese and Japanese Americans is to reverse the usual 
direction of prediction. Data from the 1980 census show 
that the proportion of Chinese Americans employed in 
managerial,  professional, or technical occupations was 
55% and that of Japanese was 46%. (For Whites, the cor- 
responding figure was  34%.) Using the well-established 
correlation between intelligence test scores and occupa- 
tional level, Flynn (1991, p. 99) calculated the mean IQ 
that a  hypothetical White group "would have to have" 
to predict the same proportions of upper-level employ- 
ment.  He found that the occupational success of these 
Chinese Americans--whose mean IQ was in fact slightly 
below 100--was what would be expected of  a White group 
with an IQ of almost 120! A similar calculation for Jap- 
anese Americans shows that their level of achievement 
matched  that  of Whites  averaging  110.  These  "over- 
achievements" serve as sharp reminders of the limitations 
of  IQ-based  prediction.  Various  aspects  of  Chinese 
American and Japanese  American  culture surely con- 
tribute  to  them  (Schneider,  Hieshima,  Lee,  &  Plank, 
1994); gene-based temperamental factors could conceiv- 
ably be playing a  role as well (Freedman &  Freedman, 
1969). 
Hispanic Americans.  Hispanic immigrants have 
come to America from many countries. In 1993, the larg- 
est Latino groups in the continental United States were 
Mexican Americans (64%), Puerto Ricans (11%), Central 
and South Americans (13%), and Cubans (5%) (U.S. Bu- 
reau of the Census, 1994). There are very substantial cul- 
tural differences among these nationality groups, as well 
as differences in  academic achievement (Duran,  1983; 
United  States  National  Commission  for Employment 
Policy, 1982). Taken together, Latinos make up the second 
largest and the fastest-growing minority group in America 
(Davis, Haub, & Willette,  1983; Eyde, 1992). 
In the United States, the mean intelligence test scores 
of Hispanics typically lie between those of Blacks and 
Whites.  There are also differences in the patterning of 
scores across different abilities and subtests (Hennessy & 
Merrifield, 1978; Lesser, Fifer, & Clark, 1965). Linguistic 
factors play a  particularly important role for Hispanic 
Americans, who may know relatively little English. (By 
one estimate, 25% of Puerto Ricans and Mexican Amer- 
icans and at least 40% of  Cubans speak English "not well" 
or "not at all" [Rodriguez,  1992]). Even those who de- 
scribe themselves as bilingual may be at a disadvantage 
if Spanish was their first and best-learned language. It is 
not surprising that Latino children typically score higher 
on the performance than on the verbal subtests of the 
English-based Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-- 
Revised (WISC-R;  Kaufman,  1994).  Nevertheless, the 
predictive validity of Latino test scores is not negligible. 
In young children, the WISC-R has reasonably high cor- 
relations with school achievement measures (McShane 
& Cook,  1985). For high school students of moderate to 
high English proficiency, standard aptitude tests predict 
first-year college grades about as well as they do for non- 
Hispanic Whites (Pennock-Roman, 1992). 
Native Americans.  There are a great many cul- 
turally distinct  North  American Indian tribes (Driver, 
1969),  speaking  some  200  different  languages  (Leap, 
1981).  Many  Native  Americans  live  on  reservations, 
which themselves represent a great variety of ecological 
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ropolitan areas (Brandt,  1984). Although few generaliza- 
tions can be appropriate across so wide a range, two or 
three points seem fairly well established. The first is a 
specific relation between ecology and cognition: the Inuit 
(Eskimo) and other groups that live in the arctic tend to 
have particularly high visual-spatial skills. (For a review 
see McShane &  Berry,  1988.) Moroever, there seem to 
be no substantial  sex differences in those skills (Berry, 
1974). It seems likely that this represents an adaptation-- 
genetic or learned or both--to the difficult hunting, trav- 
eling, and living conditions that characterize the arctic 
environment. 
On the average, Indian children obtain relatively low 
scores on tests of verbal intelligence, which are often ad- 
ministered in school settings. The result is a performance- 
test/verbal-test discrepancy similar to that exhibited by 
Hispanic Americans and other groups whose first lan- 
guage is generally not English.  Moreover, many Indian 
children suffer from chronic middle-ear infection (otitis 
media), which is "the leading identifiable disease among 
Indians since record-keeping began in 1962" (McShane 
& Plas, 1984a, p. 84). Hearing loss can have marked neg- 
ative effects on verbal test performance (McShane & Plas, 
1984b). 
African Americans.  The relatively low mean of 
the  distribution  of African  American  intelligence test 
scores has been discussed for many years. Although stud- 
ies using different tests and samples yield a range of  results, 
the Black mean is typically about one standard deviation 
(about  15  points) below that of Whites  (Jensen,  1980; 
Loehlin et at., 1975; Reynolds et at., 1987). The difference 
is largest on those tests (verbal or nonverbal) that best 
represent the general intelligence factor g (Jensen, 1985). 
It is possible, however, that this differential is diminishing. 
In the most recent restandardlzation of  the Stanford-Binet 
test, the Black/White differential was 13 points for youn- 
ger children and l0 points for older children (Thorndike, 
Hagen, & Sattler,  1986). In several other studies of chil- 
dren since  1980, the Black mean has consistently been 
over 90 and the differential has been in single digits (Vin- 
cent, 1991). Larger and more definitive studies are needed 
before this trend can be regarded as established. 
Another  reason  to  think  the  IQ  mean  might  be 
changing is that the Black/White differential in achieve- 
ment scores has diminished substantially in the last few 
years. Consider, for example, the mathematics achieve- 
ment of 17-year-olds as measured by the National As- 
sessment  of Educational  Progress (NAEP).  The differ- 
ential between Black and White scores, about 1.1 standard 
deviations as recently as 1978, had shrunk to .65 SD by 
1990 (Grissmer et at., 1994) because of Black gains. His- 
panics showed similar but smaller gains; there was little 
change  in  the  scores  of Whites.  Other  assessments  of 
school achievement also show substantial recent gains in 
the performance of minority children. 
In their own analysis of these gains, Grissmer et al. 
(1994) cite both demographic factors and the effects of 
public policy. They found the level of parents' education 
to be a  particularly good predictor of children's school 
achievement; that level increased for all groups between 
1970 and 1990, but most sharply for Blacks. Family size 
was another good predictor (children from smaller fam- 
ilies tend to achieve higher scores); here too, the largest 
change over time was among Blacks. Above and beyond 
these demographic effects, Grissmer et at.  believe that 
some of the gains can be attributed to the many specific 
programs, geared to the education of minority children, 
that were implemented during that period. 
Test bias.  It is often argued that the lower mean 
scores of African Americans reflect a bias in the intelli- 
gence tests themselves. This argument is right in one sense 
of "bias" but wrong in another. To see the first of these, 
consider how the term is used in probability theory. When 
a coin comes up heads consistently for any reason it is 
said to be "biased," regardless of any consequences that 
the outcome may or may not have. In this sense the Black/ 
White score differential is  ipso facto evidence of what 
may be called "outcome bias."  African Americans are 
subject to outcome bias not only with respect to tests but 
along many dimensions of American life. They have the 
short end of nearly every stick: average income, repre- 
sentation  in  high-level  occupations,  health  and  health 
care, death  rate,  confrontations with the  legal system, 
and so on. With this situation in mind, some critics regard 
the test score differential as just another example of a 
pervasive outcome bias that characterizes our society as 
a whole (Jackson,  1975; Mercer,  1984). Although there 
is a  sense in which they are right, this critique ignores 
the particular social purpose that tests are designed to 
serve. 
From an educational point of  view, the chief  function 
of mental tests is as predictors  (Section 2). Intelligence 
tests predict school performance fairly well, at least in 
American schools as they are now constituted. Similarly, 
achievement tests are  fairly good predictors of perfor- 
mance in college and postgraduate settings. Considered 
in this light,  the relevant question is whether the tests 
have a "predictive bias" against Blacks. Such a bias would 
exist if African American performance on the criterion 
variables (school achievement, college GPA, etc.) were 
systematically higher than the same subjects' test scores 
would predict. This is not the case. The actual regression 
lines (which  show the mean criterion performance for 
individuals who got various scores on the predictor) for 
Blacks do not lie above those for Whites; there is even a 
slight  tendency  in  the  other  direction  (Jensen,  1980; 
Reynolds &  Brown,  1984). Considered as predictors of 
future performance, the tests do not seem to be biased 
against African Americans. 
Characteristics  of tests.  It has been suggested 
that various aspects of the way tests are formulated and 
administered may put African Americans at a disadvan- 
tage. The language of  testing is a standard form of  English 
with which  some  Blacks may not be familiar;  specific 
vocabulary items are often unfamiliar to Black children; 
the tests are often given by White examiners rather than 
by more familiar Black teachers; African Americans may 
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reflect White values; the time demands of some tests may 
be alien to Black culture. (Similar suggestions have been 
made in connection with the test performance of Hispanic 
Americans, e.g.,  Rodriguez,  1992.)  Many of these sug- 
gestions are plausible, and such mechanisms may play a 
role in particular cases. Controlled studies have shown, 
however, that none of them contributes substantially to 
the Black/White differential under discussion here (Jen- 
sen,  1980; Reynolds & Brown,  1984; for a different view 
see Helms, 1992). Moreover, efforts to devise reliable and 
valid tests that would minimize disadvantages of this kind 
have been unsuccessful. 
Interpreting Group Differences 
If  group differences in test performance do not result from 
the simple forms of bias reviewed above, what is respon- 
sible for them? The fact is that we do not know. Various 
explanations have been proposed, but none is generally 
accepted.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  these  differences-- 
whatever their origin--are well within the range of effect 
sizes that can be produced by environmental factors. The 
Black/White differential amounts to one standard devia- 
tion or less, and we know that environmental factors have 
recently raised mean test scores in many populations by 
at least that much (Flynn,  1987:  see  Section 4).  To be 
sure, the "Flynn effect" is itself poorly understood: it may 
reflect generational changes in culture, improved nutri- 
tion, or other factors as yet unknown. Whatever may be 
responsible for it, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the  same  factors  play  a  role  in  contemporary  group 
differences. 
Socioeconomic  factors.  Several  specific  envi- 
ronmental/cultural explanations of those differences have 
been proposed. All of them refer to the general life situ- 
ation  in  which  contemporary  African  Americans  find 
themselves, but that situation can be described in several 
different  ways.  The  simplest  such  hypothesis  can  be 
framed in economic terms. On the average, Blacks have 
lower incomes than Whites; a much higher proportion of 
them are l~oor. It is plausible to suppose that many in- 
evitable aspects of poverty--poor nutrition,  frequently 
inadequate prenatal care, lack of intellectual resources-- 
have negative effects on children's developing intelligence. 
Indeed, the correlation between "socioeconomic status" 
(SES)  and  scores  on  intelligence  tests  is  well-known 
(White,  1982). 
Several considerations  suggest that this cannot be 
the whole explanation.  For one thing,  the Black/White 
differential in test scores is not eliminated when groups 
or individuals are matched for SES (Loehlin et al., 1975). 
Moreover, the data reviewed in Section 4 suggest that-- 
if we exclude extreme conditions--nutrition  and other 
biological factors that  may vary with  SES  account  for 
relatively little of the variance in such scores. Finally, the 
(relatively weak) relationship between test scores and in- 
come is much more complex than a simple SES hypoth- 
esis would suggest. The living conditions of children result 
in part from the accomplishments of their parents: If  the 
skills measured by psychometric tests actually matter for 
those accomplishments, intelligence is affecting SES rather 
than the other way around.  We do not know the mag- 
nitude of these various effects in various populations, but 
it is clear that no model in which "SES" directly deter- 
mines "IQ" will do. 
A  more  fundamental  difficulty  with  explanations 
based on economics alone appears from a different per- 
spective. To imagine that any simple income- and edu- 
cation-based index can adequately describe the situation 
of African Americans is to ignore important categories 
of experience. The sense of belonging to a group with a 
distinctive culture--one that has long been the target of 
oppression--and the awareness or anticipation of racial 
discrimination  are  profound personal  experiences,  not 
just aspects of socioeconomic status. Some of these more 
deeply  rooted  differences  are  addressed  by  other  hy- 
potheses, based on caste and culture. 
Caste-like minorities.  Most discussions of this 
issue  treat  Black/White  differences  as  aspects  of  a 
uniquely "American dilemma" (Myrdal, 1944). The fact 
is, however, that comparably disadvantaged groups exist 
in many countries: the Maori in New Zealand, scheduled 
castes ("untouchables") in India, non-European Jews in 
Israel, the Burakumin in Japan. All these are "caste-like" 
(Ogbu,  1978) or "involuntary" (Ogbu,  1994) minorities. 
John Ogbu distinguishes this status from that of"auton- 
omous" minorities who are not politically or economi- 
cally subordinated (like Amish or Mormons in the United 
States),  and  from that  of "immigrant"  or "voluntary" 
minorities who initially came to their new homes with 
positive expectations. Immigrant minorities expect their 
situations to improve; they tend to compare themselves 
favorably with peers in the old country, not unfavorably 
with members of the dominant majority. In contrast, to 
be born into a  caste-like minority is to grow up firmly 
convinced that one's life will eventually be restricted to 
a small and poorly-rewarded set of social roles. 
Distinctions  of caste are not always linked  to per- 
ceptions of race. In some countries lower and upper caste 
groups differ by appearance and are assumed to be racially 
distinct; in others they are not. The social and educational 
consequences  are the  same in  both cases.  All  over the 
world,  the children  of caste-like minorities do less well 
in school than upper-caste children and drop out sooner. 
Where there are data,  they have usually been found to 
have lower test scores as well. 
In explaining these findings, Ogbu (1978) argues that 
the children of caste-like minorities do not have "effort 
optimism," i.e., the conviction that hard work (especially 
hard schoolwork) and serious commitment on their part 
will actually be rewarded. As a result they ignore or reject 
the forms of learning that are offered in school.  Indeed 
they may practice a sort of cultural inversion, deliberately 
rejecting certain behaviors (such as academic achievement 
or other forms of "acting White") that are seen as char- 
acteristic  of the  dominant  group.  While  the  extent  to 
which the attitudes described by Ogbu (1978,  1994) are 
responsible for African American test scores and school 
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seem that familiar problems can take on quite a different 
look  when  they  are  viewed  from  an  international 
perspective. 
African American culture.  According to Boykin 
(1986,  1994),  there is a  fundamental  conflict between 
certain aspects of African American culture on the one 
hand  and  the  implicit  cultural  commitments  of most 
American schools on the other. "When children are or- 
dered to do their own work, arrive at their own individual 
answers,  work only with their own materials,  they are 
being sent cultural messages. When children come to be- 
lieve that getting up and moving about the classroom is 
inappropriate, they are being sent powerful cultural mes- 
sages. When children come to confine their 'learning' to 
consistently bracketed time periods, when they are con- 
sistently prompted to tell what they know and not how 
they feel, when they are led to believe that they are com- 
pletely responsible for their own success and failure, when 
they are required to consistently put forth considerable 
effort for effort's sake on tedious and personally irrelevant 
tasks..,  then they are pervasively having cultural lessons 
imposed on them" (1994, p.  125). 
In Boykin's view, the combination of constriction 
and competition that most American schools demand of 
their pupils conflicts with certain themes in the "deep 
structure" of African American culture. That culture in- 
cludes an emphasis on such aspects of  experience as spir- 
ituality, harmony, movement, verve, affect, expressive in- 
dividualism, communalism, orality, and a socially defined 
time perspective (Boykin,  1986,  1994). While it is not 
shared by all African Americans to the same degree, its 
accessibility and familiarity give it a profound influence. 
The result of  this cultural conflict, in Boykin's view, 
is that many Black children become alienated from both 
the process and the products of the education to which 
they are exposed. One  aspect  of that process,  now an 
intrinsic aspect of the culture of most American schools, 
is the psychometric enterprise itself. He argues (Boykin, 
1994) that the successful education of African American 
children will require an approach that is less concerned 
with talent sorting and assessment, more concerned with 
talent development. 
One further factor should not be overlooked. Only 
a  single  generation  has  passed  since  the  Civil  Rights 
movement opened new doors for African Americans, and 
many forms of discrimination are still all too familiar in 
their experience today. Hard enough to bear in its own 
right, discrimination is also a  sharp reminder of a  still 
more intolerable past. It would be rash indeed to assume 
that those experiences, and that historical legacy, have 
no impact on intellectual development. 
The genetic  hypothesis.  It is  sometimes sug- 
gested that the Black/White differential in psychometric 
intelligence is partly due to genetic differences (Jensen, 
1972). There is not much direct evidence on this point, 
but what  little there is fails to support the genetic hy- 
pothesis. One piece of evidence comes from a  study of 
the children of American soldiers stationed in Germany 
after the Second World War (Eyferth,  1961): there was 
no mean difference between the test scores of those chil- 
dren whose fathers were White and those whose fathers 
were Black. (For a  discussion  of possible confounds in 
this study,  see Flynn,  1980.) Moreover, several studies 
have used blood-group methods to estimate the degree 
of African ancestry of American Blacks; there were no 
significant correlations between those estimates and IQ 
scores (Loehlin,  Vandenberg,  &  Osborne,  1973;  Scarr, 
Pakstis, Katz, & Barker, 1977). 
It is clear (Section 3) that genes make a substantial 
contribution to individual differences in intelligence test 
scores,  at least  in  the  White  population.  The fact is, 
however, that  the high  heritability of a  trait  within  a 
given group has no necessary implications for the source 
of a  difference between groups (Loehlin et al.,  1975). 
This is  now generally understood  (e.g.,  Herrnstein  & 
Murray,  1994). But even though no such implication is 
necessary,  some  have argued  that  a  high  value  of h 2 
makes a genetic contribution to group differences more 
plausible.  Does it? 
That depends on one's assessment of the actual dif- 
ference between the two environments. Consider Lewon- 
tin's (1970) well-known example of s¢eds from the same 
genetically variable stock that are planted in two different 
fields. If the plants in field X are fertilized appropriately 
while key nutrients are withheld from those in field Y, 
we have produced an entirely environmental group dif- 
ference. This example works (i.e., h 2 is genuinely irrele- 
vant to the differential between the fields) because the 
differences between the effective environments of X  and 
Y  are both large and consistent. Are the environmental 
and cultural situations of American Blacks and Whites 
also  substantially  and  consistently  different--different 
enough to make this a good analogy? If so, the within- 
group heritability of IQ scores is irrelevant to the issue. 
Or are those situations similar enough to suggest that the 
analogy is inappropriate, and that one can plausibly gen- 
eralize from within-group heritabilities? Thus the issue 
ultimately comes down to a personal judgment: How dif- 
ferent are  the  relevant life experiences of Whites  and 
Blacks in the United States today? At present, this ques- 
tion has no scientific answer. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Because there are many ways to be intelligent, there are 
also many conceptualizations of intelligence. The most 
influential approach, and the one that has generated the 
most systematic research, is based on psychometric test- 
ing.  This tradition has produced a  substantial  body of 
knowledge, though many questions remain unanswered. 
We know much less about the forms of intelligence that 
tests do  not easily assess:  wisdom,  creativity, practical 
knowledge, social skill, and the like. 
Psychometricians have successfully measured a wide 
range of abilities, distinct from one another and yet in- 
tercorrelated. The complex relations among those abilities 
can be described in many ways. Some theorists focus on 
the variance that all such abilities have in common, which 
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to describe the same manifold with a set of partially in- 
dependent factors; still others opt for a multifactorial de- 
scription with factors hierarchically arranged and some- 
thing like g at the top. Standardized intelligence test scores 
("IQs"), which reflect a person's standing in relation to 
his or her age cohort, are based on tests that tap a number 
of  different abilities. Recent studies have found that these 
scores are also correlated with information processing 
speed in certain experimental paradigms (choice reaction 
time, inspection time, evoked brain potentials, etc.), but 
the meaning of those correlations is far from clear. 
Intelligence test scores predict individual differences 
in school achievement moderately well, correlating about 
.50 with grade point average and .55 with the number of 
years of  education that individuals complete. In this con- 
text the skills measured by tests are clearly important. 
Nevertheless, population levels of  school achievement are 
not determined solely or even primarily by intelligence 
or any other individual-difference variable. The fact that 
children in Japan and Taiwan learn much more mathe- 
matics than their peers in America, for example, can be 
attributed primarily to differences in culture and school- 
ing rather than in abilities measured by intelligence tests. 
Test scores also correlate with measures of accom- 
plishment outside of school, e.g., with adult occupational 
status. To some extent those correlations result directly 
from the tests' link with school achievement and from 
their roles as "gatekeepers." In the United States today, 
high test scores and grades are prerequisites for entry into 
many careers and professions. This is not quite the whole 
story, however: a significant correlation between psycho- 
metric intelligence and occupational status remains even 
when measures of education and family background have 
been statistically controlled. There are also modest (neg- 
ative) correlations between intelligence test scores and 
certain  undesirable  behaviors  such  as juvenile  crime. 
Those correlations are necessarily low: all social outcomes 
result from complex causal webs in which psychometric 
skills are only one factor. 
Like every trait, intelligence is the joint product of 
genetic and environmental variables. Gene action always 
involves a (biochemical or social) environment; environ- 
ments always act via structures to which genes have con- 
tributed. Given a trait on which individuals vary, however, 
one can ask what fraction of that variation is associated 
with differences in their genotypes (this is the heritability 
of the trait) as well as what fraction is associated with 
differences in environmental experience. So defined, her- 
itability (h  a) can and does vary from one population to 
another. In the case of IQ, h 2 is markedly lower for chil- 
dren (about .45) than for adults (about .75). This means 
that as children grow up, differences in test scores tend 
increasingly to reflect differences in genotype and in in- 
dividual life experience rather than differences among the 
families in which they were raised. 
The factors underlying that  shift--and  more gen- 
erally the pathways by which genes make their undoubted 
contributions to individual differences in intelligence-- 
are largely unknown. Moreover, the environmental con- 
tributions to those differences are almost equally mys- 
terious. We know that both biological and social aspects 
of  the environment are important for intelligence, but we 
are a long way from understanding how they exert their 
effects. 
One environmental variable with clear-cut impor- 
tance is the presence of formal schooling. Schools affect 
intelligence in many ways, not only by transmitting spe- 
cific information but by developing certain intellectual 
skills and attitudes. Failure to attend school (or attendance 
at very poor schools) has a clear negative effect on intel- 
ligence test scores. Preschool programs and similar in- 
terventions often have positive effects, but in most cases 
the gains fade when the program is over. 
A  number of conditions in the biological environ- 
ment  have clear negative consequences for intellectual 
development. Some of these--very important when they 
occur--nevertheless do not contribute much to the pop- 
ulation variance of IQ scores because they are relatively 
rare. (Perinatal complications are one such factor.) Ex- 
posure to environmental lead has well-documented neg- 
ative effects; so too does prenatal exposure to high blood 
levels of alcohol. Malnutrition in childhood is another 
negative factor for intelligence, but the level at which its 
effects become significant has not been clearly established. 
Some studies suggest that dietary supplements of certain 
micro-nutrients can produce gains even in otherwise well- 
nourished individuals, but the effects are still controversial 
and there has been no long-term follow-up. 
One of the most striking phenomena in this field is 
the steady worldwide rise in test scores, now often called 
the "Flynn effect." Mean IQs have increased more than 
15 points--a full standard deviation--in the last 50 years, 
and the rate of gain may be increasing. These gains may 
result from improved nutrition, cultural changes, expe- 
rience with testing,  shifts in schooling or child-rearing 
practices, or some other factor as yet unknown. 
Although there are no important sex differences in 
overall intelligence test scores, substantial differences do 
appear for specific abilities. Males typically score higher 
on visual-spatial  and  (beginning in  middle  childhood) 
mathematical skills; females excel on a number of verbal 
measures. Sex hormone levels are clearly related to some 
of these differences, but social factors presumably play a 
role as well. As for all the group differences reviewed here, 
the range of  performance within each group is much larger 
than the mean difference between groups. 
Because  ethnic  differences  in  intelligence  reflect 
complex patterns, no overall generalization about them 
is appropriate. The mean IQ scores of Chinese and Jap- 
anese Americans, for example, differ little from those of 
Whites  though  their  spatial  ability  scores  tend  to  be 
somewhat higher. The outstanding record of  these groups 
in terms of school achievement and occupational status 
evidently reflects cultural factors. The mean intelligence 
test scores of Hispanic Americans are somewhat lower 
than those of Whites, in part because Hispanics are often 
less familiar with English. Nevertheless, their test scores, 
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predictors of school and college achievement. 
African  American  IQ  scores  have  long  averaged 
about 15 points below those of Whites, with correspond- 
ingly  lower  scores  on  academic  achievement  tests.  In 
recent years the achievement-test gap has narrowed ap- 
preciably.  It is  possible  that the  IQ-score differential  is 
narrowing  as well,  but this  has  not been  clearly estab- 
lished.  The cause of that differential  is not known; it is 
apparently  not  due  to any  simple  form  of bias  in  the 
content  or administration  of the  tests  themselves.  The 
Flynn effect shows that environmental  factors can pro- 
duce differences of at least this magnitude, but that effect 
is  mysterious in its own right.  Several  culturally-based 
explanations of the Black/White IQ differential have been 
proposed; some are plausible,  but so far none has been 
conclusively supported. There is even less empirical sup- 
port for a  genetic interpretation.  In short,  no adequate 
explanation of the differential between the IQ means of 
Blacks and Whites is presently available. 
It is  customary to  conclude  surveys  like  this  one 
with a  summary of what has been established.  Indeed, 
much is now known about intelligence.  A  near-century 
of research,  most of it based on psychometric methods, 
has produced an impressive body of findings. Although 
we have tried to do justice to those findings in this report, 
it seems appropriate to conclude on a  different note.  In 
this contentious arena,  our most useful role may be to 
remind  our readers  that many of the critical  questions 
about intelligence are still unanswered. Here are a few of 
those questions: 
1. Differences in genetic endowment contribute sub- 
stantially to individual  differences in (psychometric) in- 
telligence, but the pathway by which genes produce their 
effects is still unknown. The impact of  genetic differences 
appears to increase with age, but we do not know why. 
2.  Environmental  factors also  contribute  substan- 
tially to the development  of intelligence,  but we do not 
clearly understand  what  those  factors are  or how they 
work.  Attendance  at  school is  certainly  important,  for 
example, but we do not know what aspects of schooling 
are critical. 
3.  The  role  of nutrition  in  intelligence  remains 
obscure.  Severe childhood malnutrition has clear neg- 
ative effects, but the hypothesis that particular "micro- 
nutrients"  may  affect  intelligence  in  otherwise  ade- 
quately-fed populations has not yet been convincingly 
demonstrated. 
4. There are significant correlations between  mea- 
sures of information-processing speed and psychometric 
intelligence, but the overall pattern of these findings yields 
no easy theoretical interpretation. 
5. Mean scores on intelligence tests are rising steadily. 
They have gone up a  full standard deviation  in the last 
50 years or so, and the rate of gain may be increasing. 
No one is sure why these  gains are  happening or what 
they mean. 
6. The differential between the mean intelligence test 
scores of Blacks and Whites (about one standard devia- 
tion, although it may be diminishing) does not result from 
any obvious biases in test construction and administra- 
tion,  nor does it simply reflect differences in socioeco- 
nomic status. Explanations based on factors of caste and 
culture may be appropriate,  but so far have little direct 
empirical support. There is certainly no such support for 
a genetic interpretation.  At present,  no one knows what 
causes this differential. 
7. It is widely agreed that standardized tests do not 
sample  all  forms of intelligence.  Obvious examples  in- 
clude creativity, wisdom, practical sense, and social sen- 
sitivity; there are surely others.  Despite the importance 
of these  abilities  we know very little  about  them:  how 
they develop,  what  factors influence  that  development, 
how they are related to more traditional  measures. 
In a field where so many issues are unresolved and 
so many questions unanswered,  the confident tone that 
has characterized  most of the debate  on these topics is 
clearly out of place.  The study of intelligence  does not 
need politicized assertions and recriminations;  it needs 
self-restraint,  reflection, and a great deal more research. 
The questions that remain  are socially as well as scien- 
tifically important. There is no reason to think them un- 
answerable, but finding the answers will require a shared 
and sustained  effort as well as the commitment of sub- 
stantial  scientific resources.  Just such a  commitment is 
what we strongly recommend. 
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